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JOHN R. OWENS

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TENNESSEE DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL PRIMARIES, 1948-1964 — William Buchanan and Agnes Bird

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MONEY AND POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA: DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL PRIMARY, 1964

JOHN R. OWENS

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FOREWORD

This is the second report by the Citizens' Research Foundation of the financing of primary campaigns for nomination for U.S. Senator in 1964. The first dealt with Tennessee; this deals with California. Taken together, they point up the impact of money on the nomination process—a subject too long neglected in the literature. The present study was prepared by Professor John R. Owens of the University of California at Davis.

This publication is another in a new series made possible under a grant from the Ford Foundation to the Citizens' Research Foundation. Other aspects of money in politics in 1964 will be reported in other publications in this series.

The presentation and conclusions are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of members of the Board of Trustees of the Citizens' Research Foundation.

William H. Vanderbilt

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I. CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE NOMINATION PROCESS

Shortly after the adjournment of the California Legislature in June 1964, Governor Edmund G. Brown expressed disappointment over the legislature's failure to carry out his recommendation to establish an electoral reform study commission. The Governor in referring to the need for such a commission noted that "political contributions are the most dangerous things in California today . . . someday there is going to be a major scandal." These words reflected the deep anxiety of the Governor and many other public officials over the troublesome problem of campaign finance in the Golden State. As anyone familiar with California politics knows, running for public office can be very expensive, and it has become increasingly more difficult to raise the funds needed to meet the sky-rocketing costs of political campaigns.

Something other than the legislature's defeat of his proposed electoral commission, however, prompted the Governor to comment on campaign finance. He was still in a mild state of shock caused by the costs of the recently-ended senatorial primary—a bitterly fought race in which the Governor's favored candidate had been defeated after spending nearly $1,000,000 to gain the Democratic nomination.

The 1964 Democratic primary in California for the United States senatorial nomination was one of the most exciting, colorful and competitive political contests in many years. The battle was between the nationally-known former White House Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, and the popular state Controller, Alan Cranston. Though born and raised in California, Salinger had not lived in the state for several years. At the time he announced his candidacy he was a resident of Virginia and could not vote in California. Yet, as Press Secretary to John F. Kennedy, he was known to millions of Californians as a voice of the New Frontier and he was a familiar personality.

Alan Cranston was less of a national figure since he lived and worked most of his life in California. But he had been active in state politics, and as the first President of the California Democratic Council, had helped to revive the state's moribund Democratic party. In 1958, when the Democrats under Governor Brown's leadership captured the state government for the first time in sixteen years, Cranston was elected Controller. He was re-elected in 1962, leading the Democratic ticket and obtaining the largest majority ever given in a contested statewide race. The 1964 campaign became a contest between the party stalwart, Alan Cranston, who had the backing of the party's establishment, and Pierre Salinger, the celebrated press secretary who

had little organizational support but whose name was well-known.

Yet the primary involved more than the political fortunes of these two men. Practically every major figure in the Democratic party was drawn into the race before it was over. The leadership of Governor Brown, the political fortunes of Speaker of the Assembly Jesse Unruh, the effectiveness of the California Democratic Council and the volunteer movement were all at stake. All these factors combined to turn the primary into a raging party battle and to make it probably the most expensive primary in California's history.

This study deals with the role money played in decisions of various potential candidates in the 1964 primary and with the costs, where the money came from, how it was raised, who raised it, and how it was spent. The first section raises the issue of political funds and nominations in the context of California politics. The next section discusses the California senatorial primary, the candidates and the major issues of the campaign. This is followed by an exploration of the role of money in narrowing the field of candidates in the Democratic contest. We turn next to the Democratic candidates who entered the senatorial race and discuss the financing of their campaigns. We then examine the overall costs of the primary, follow this with an examination of the patterns of expenditures, and finally discuss the sources of the candidates' funds.

Political Funds and Nominations

Alexander Heard has observed, "the giving, receiving, and handling of political money is a unique and especially important form of political action . . . it ranks next to voting itself in deserving study."[1] The financing of campaigns is one of the most perplexing political problems in the United States today. The crux of the problem is that it costs a great deal of money to run for public office. Herbert E. Alexander has estimated that the costs of all national, state and local campaigns in 1964 amounted to about $200 million.[2] Although there has been some rise in campaign costs due largely to the increased use of television and other expensive communication media, Professor Heard has pointed out that such costs are not a high price for a wealthy society to pay for the means of freely choosing its leaders. What is disturbing is that high costs and the difficulties of raising funds may prevent well-qualified candidates from seeking office.

Political campaigns in the United States are financed from private

[1] Alexander Heard, *The Costs of Democracy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 3.

[2] Herbert E. Alexander, *Financing the 1964 Election* (Princeton: Citizens' Research Foundation, 1966), p. 12.

sources. One interested in public office must either be independently wealthy or able to attract adequate funds to support his political ambitions. A candidate may obtain his money from many sources and it may be given to him for diverse reasons. Yet the individuals or groups who give the most money and give most often may want something from government. The big contributors sometimes have an important stake in the decisions of government, and in giving may hope for some return. Some contributors may expect nothing more than access to the officeholder, while others might seek favors of a more dubious nature. The notion that an officeholder is elected to serve the people, and all the people equally, may be compromised by our system of campaign finance.

For various reasons many problems of campaign finance are accentuated in California. California is the most populous state in the union, with over eight million registered voters, and it is the third largest state in land area. Given this size, organizing a statewide campaign for elective office becomes an enormous and expensive task. It costs a Democratic candidate, for example, more than $200,000 to send a single first class mailing to registered voters in his party. The character of the electorate affects campaign costs too. The state's population has grown at an explosive pace almost continuously since the 1930's, resulting in an ever changing and highly mobile electorate with tenuous political ties and unstable party loyalties. Although Democrats outnumber Republicans three to two, party labels are not always meaningful and elections are very competitive.

Furthermore, the burden of raising the funds for these expensive campaigns is placed almost entirely on the shoulders of the candidates. The political parties are relatively weak organizations, particularly at the grass roots level, and most candidates have to run their own campaigns. Campaign appeals focus on the candidate and his personality, rather than on the political party, and the mass media play an important role in projecting the image of the candidate to the public. Since the campaign consists largely of publicizing the candidate, extensive use is made of professional public relations firms in the management of campaigns. Wide use of television and the employment of publicity experts naturally raise costs. Because the candidate is personally responsible for his own election in a primary, most of the fund raising becomes his responsibility too. The political parties cannot offer assistance in a primary, although in recent years both parties have taken on more fund raising responsibilities in general election campaigns.

Since this study deals with a primary rather than the general election, it provides an opportunity to explore the frequently discussed,

but little understood, matter of the role of money in the nominating process. It is often argued that money has a more important influence on the nominating decision than in any other phase of politics, and that money plays a very crucial role in deciding who will or will not be a candidate for a party's nomination. For example, Henry Turner and John Vieg state that "there is no question but that a considerable amount of money is required to elect a candidate to most partisan offices in California, and that a certain minimum amount is necessary in order to make the race. It is therefore obvious that those who control the major contributions may determine who can or cannot run for a particular office."[3]

These authors cite as a case in point the withdrawal of Governor Goodwin J. Knight from the California gubernatorial race in 1958. Governor Knight, who had previously announced his intention to seek re-election, stepped aside for Senator William Knowland only after certain "wealthy backers advised him that they would withdraw their support if he opposed Knowland for the Republican gubernatorial nomination but would contribute to his campaign for the Senate."[4] Both candidates eventually were defeated. Another reported instance of the power of money concerned the candidacy of Professor Peter H. Odegard who in 1954 decided not to run for the United States Senate because he was unable to obtain financial assurances from Edward Heller, at that time a large contributor to Democratic candidates.[5] These are only two of the known instances, but probably others have gone unreported. This kind of influence is mostly exerted in private, and the public is often unaware of this power of wealthy contributors.

Of the potential candidates who considered running in 1964, all faced risks. Money was only one of the factors in the risk decision, but its importance can only be understood in the context of all other factors. Indeed the importance of money may be exaggerated for failure to appreciate other considerations. For example, in the case of Governor Knight, can we be certain that the crucial factor in his decision to withdraw involved pressure from certain financial contributors? Or was it only one of many factors and in itself not determinative? According to one qualified Republican observer, George Christopher, the former Mayor of San Francisco, Governor Knight "maneuvered himself out of the race." Mr. Christopher maintained that "there were three or four polls, and it was evident he [Knight] was losing the race so he

[3] Henry Turner and John Vieg, *The Government and Politics of California,* 2nd ed., (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co. Inc., 1964), p. 69.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Francis Carney, *The Rise of the Democratic Clubs in California,* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1958), p. 12-15.

withdrew."[6] It seems remarkable that an incumbent governor could be forced out of the race, or would not have a fairly dependable financial base after four years in Sacramento. Yet other factors than the pressure of large contributors may well have kept Knight from running for governor again.

II. THE 1964 DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL PRIMARY

California Democrats looked forward to a quiet and uneventful primary to be held in June, 1964. The only important office at stake was the United States Senate seat and the Democratic incumbent, Clair Engle, was expected to seek re-election. But this state of tranquility ended abruptly when the newspapers reported on August 27, 1963, that Senator Engle had entered a hospital for a major operation. A hospital bulletin issued a day later announced that the Senator had undergone brain surgery to correct some difficulty he was having with his arm.

The first reaction of Democratic leaders was one of sympathy for the ailing Senator; they regretted his illness and wished him a rapid recovery. But soon sympathy turned to anxious concern when they heard rumors that the operation had left the Senator physically impaired. Throughout September uneasiness over Engle's condition increased, until finally the worst fears were confirmed when a news story reliably reported that Engle's operation had left him partially paralyzed and with a speech impediment. The story also speculated that the doctors had discovered an inoperable brain tumor.

This report, raising the possibility that Senator Engle might be unable to campaign for re-election, aroused the interest of a number of aspiring candidates. Most of them were mere dreamers with no real chance of nomination, but there were a few whose senatorial aspirations merited attention; they were: Attorney General Stanley Mosk, Controller Alan Cranston and Congressman James Roosevelt. In order to end speculation about his political future and to discourage further interest in his seat, Senator Engle announced on January 6, 1964 that he would be a candidate for re-election. In a 42-second television film, speaking hesitantly and with great difficulty, the Senator said "I am happy to announce that . . . the medical men have given me the green light and I am off and running."

The party leadership greeted Engle's statement with skepticism

[6] Sacramento *Bee,* December 30, 1961.

since it did not correspond with what they knew informally about his condition. To clarify the situation, Governor Brown and other party leaders requested from Mrs. Engle a "full and complete" medical report on the Senator's health, "preferably including all relevant medical records." Dr. Roy Sexton, Engle's physician, issued a statement in late January but Democratic leaders considered it unacceptable. The Executive Committee of the Democratic State Central Committee, meeting in Los Angeles a few days later, in effect opened the Democratic primary to all comers. "We believe," the Committee noted in a resolution, "it is within the spirit of the democratic process that the public should appraise the qualifications of any candidate who shall seek the nomination for United States Senator."[1] This statement was the signal for all interested candidates to enter the contest, and Alan Cranston and James Roosevelt soon announced their candidacies. Stanley Mosk held back and made no formal declaration of his intentions, but most observers felt he too was in the race.

At the beginning of February it looked as if there would be a four-way race for the nomination with Engle, Cranston, Roosevelt and Mosk pitted against each other. But the final date for filing for the office was still almost two months away and a great deal could happen before them. In fact, the situation did change greatly. James Roosevelt withdrew as a candidate after failing to obtain the pre-primary endorsement of the California Democratic Council, and threw his support to Alan Cranston. Stanley Mosk vacillated, first indicating that he would run, then delaying an official announcement and finally declaring that he would not be a candidate. Just when it seemed that the race would be between Cranston and the ailing incumbent, another candidate appeared. On the day before the filing deadline (March 20), Pierre Salinger resigned as President Johnson's press secretary and declared that he would be a candidate for the United States Senate from California.

When Pierre Salinger arrived in San Francisco to file for office, however, he discovered that there was question about the legal status of his candidacy. Salinger had left his native state seven years before for public service in Washington and thereby forfeited his legal residence. He was presently a legal resident of Virginia and was not eligible to vote for himself in the California primary. The question was whether he could be a candidate when California law stated that a candidate must be an elector. The Republican Secretary of State insisted that Salinger was ineligible and refused to place his name on the primary ballot. Salinger hired legal counsel to contest this action and within a week the California State Supreme Court handed down a

[1] New York *Times*, January 26, 1964.

decision supporting Salinger's contention, and ordering the Secretary of State to place his name on the ballot. Although the court did not give a detailed opinion, it obviously ruled that federal constitutional requirements took precedent over state requirements, and the Federal Constitution only required that a candidate be an inhabitant of the state in which he was running.

In late April Senator Engle entered the hospital again, and by so doing shattered whatever hopes he might have had of running for re-election. He was operated on a second time and on April 28 announced his withdrawal from the race. However, it was too late to remove his name from the ballot and though not an official candidate he received over 100,000 votes. He did not recover from his illness and died in July, 1964.

The Campaign

Both Salinger and Cranston waged hard-hitting campaigns that bitterly divided the Democratic party. Both candidates argued that no ideological differences existed between them. Both claimed to be liberals of the New Frontier variety and agreed on practically all major domestic and foreign issues. The bitterness of the campaign resulted from other areas of contention: (1) the personality and qualifications of each man; (2) the impressiveness of the candidates' support and endorsements; (3) the matter of campaign tactics, particularly the question of campaign finance.

The main theme of the Salinger campaign was his identification with the martyred President Kennedy. He emphasized his association with Kennedy so often that the phrase—"I recall when President Kennedy . . ." became the hallmark of his campaign. He argued that as a close adviser and confidant of the President he was best suited to return to Washington to help California. Having been close to the men in power, he understood how things worked in the capitol and thereby could "get things done" for his state.

Though wrapping the mantle of Kennedy securely around him, Salinger managed to project an image of his own. He was a friendly, outgoing person who enjoyed a good meal with a fine wine. He enjoyed the personal contacts of politics and enjoyed nothing more than shaking every hand in sight. In contrast to Salinger, Cranston presented a more austere image. Cranston, a tall, lanky, balding man, conveyed the impression of being an intellectual, more interested in ideas than people. He showed an aversion to small talk and gave the appearance of being detached and distant. These were the images projected at the start of the campaign, but as it progressed each candidate shifted somewhat. Cranston tried to become more folksy, to

break away from his prepared speech and to mix with the crowds, whereas Salinger tried to shed his "lucky" Pierre image and to take on the air of a statesman accustomed to operating in the high councils of government.

Cranston's theme was to emphasize his familiarity with the state and its problems, which he had gained from his extensive experience in state government. He seldom failed to point out that Salinger had been absent from the state for more than seven years and was still a legal resident of Virginia. Cranston opened most speeches with the assertion that "my opponent is seeking to reapportion the Senate with three votes for Virginia and one for California." He characterized Salinger as a carpetbagger, an outsider who had abandoned his state and was now returning to grab one of its greatest prizes—the Senate seat. Salinger tried to answer this charge by pointing out that he was a native Californian, born, raised and educated in the state and that he left only to serve his government in Washington. He admitted Cranston had been a good tax collector, implying that Cranston would be lost in the Washington big league.

In the battle of endorsements, Cranston had in his corner the California Democratic Council and the Young Democrats, the major elements of organized labor, a major portion of the California congressional delegation, Governor Brown and a large number of local political leaders. His candidacy was supported by most of the major elements of what might be called the establishment of the California Democratic Party. His campaign chairman was Dan Kimball, Chairman of the Board of the Aerojet-General Corporation, who had served as Engle's campaign chairman when he first ran for the Senate.

Salinger could not match this array of supporters and endorsements. Entering the race late, most of the regular units and leaders of the party had already committed themselves. There was no real Kennedy organization, although Salinger was able to enlist Mrs. Peter Lawford, President Kennedy's sister, as his state-wide campaign co-chairman. However, important support came to Salinger when Don Bradley announced on April 1 that he would be Salinger's campaign manager. Bradley at the time was a paid employee of the Democratic State Central Committee and in the past had successfully managed a number of state-wide campaigns including the campaigns of Clair Engle and Governor Brown. He was the leading party strategist who charted Governor Brown's victory over Richard Nixon. He was a skilled political tactician, a masterful campaign manager and he had many contacts that Salinger needed to get his campaign underway. Bradley was a close personal friend of Salinger and he broke with Governor Brown when he moved to the Salinger camp.

Equally important to Salinger was the support of two other powerful political leaders in the state, Jesse Unruh, the Speaker of the California State Assembly, and Attorney General Stanley Mosk. Both, though publicly neutral until close to the end of the primary, aided Salinger in important ways. Mr. Unruh had been the liaison man for the Kennedy forces in California and epitomized the office-holding professional in politics. As the Speaker he possessed great power in the Assembly, and he was one of the most important political forces in Los Angeles. Nominally, at least, Unruh initially supported Engle for the Senate, but after Engle's withdrawal most of the political figures associated with the Unruh faction in the party endorsed Salinger. Because of this support the Cranston campaign charged Salinger with being a puppet of "boss Unruh." The CDC-endorsed Cranston represented the volunteers in politics. For some time the Unruh and CDC factions in the Democratic party had been at odds over such issues as pre-primary endorsements and the use of paid precinct workers. Stanley Mosk in the last days of the campaign announced that he also favored Salinger. Overtly, he did nothing to help Salinger, but we shall see he helped in a covert way.

Probably the most important part of the campaign involved the charges and accusations over campaign contributions hurled by the candidates at each other. Cranston forces alleged that Salinger's primary campaign would be the most expensive in the history of the state and that Salinger had been able to raise "close to a million dollars in the past two months." The real issue they charged, was "who is putting up the million" and how much is coming from "eastern sources or Unruh's special interests." On the other hand, Salinger forces countered these charges with claims that Cranston's campaign was being financed by his "politically appointed henchmen," the inheritance tax appraisers (ITA) who had come under attack many times before. The judges of the Superior Courts fix inheritance tax officers appointed by the state Controller. There are between 140 and 150 appraisers, with at least one in each county and more in the larger counties. They serve at the pleasure of the Controller. They receive as a fee a percentage of each estate probated and most of them get a good income for what is often a part-time job. For example, one of the ITA's for Los Angeles County had a net income after expenses of $25,757. However, for appraisers in smaller counties the income is less and in 1962 the Controller reported that the average net income for 135 appraisers was $10,526. The ITA system, of course, furnishes the Controller with a political organization which can be used to further his political career. In a state where political patronage is at a minimum, the Controller is the only state-wide officer, other

than the Governor, who has patronage to dispense.[2]

Although there had been some rumbling earlier about the contributions of ITA's, the issue was not brought fully into the open until the middle of May. On May 12th, state Senator Jack Schrade, a conservative Republican from San Diego County, dropped a bomb shell into the Democratic primary. He introduced Senate Resolution 140, which called for a legislative investigation of reports that Controller Cranston "is utilizing political tactics in the financing of his political activities by pressuring political contributions from state inheritance tax appraisers." The Schrade resolution resulted from charges made by John C. O'Keefe, a former ITA, that Cranston asked him for $5,000 for his 1958 campaign. O'Keefe reported that he could only give $4,000, but was appointed anyway. He went on to say in a sworn statement that Mr. Cranston's tactics have not changed, and that ". . . many of my friends, who are still appraisers, have informed me that Mr. Cranston is demanding a contribution of $5,000 toward his senatorial campaign."[3]

Needless to say, Salinger's supporters took up O'Keefe's charges and made them the principal issue in the remaining weeks of the campaign. Salinger accused Cranston of developing a political machine of ITA's through "handout and political patronage." He noted that Cranston had favored placing appraisers under civil service before becoming Controller, but after his election in 1958 "he apparently changed his mind when he discovered the advantages of patronage appointments." "The roster of Cranston's campaign aides," he charged, "reads like a directory of state tax appraisers." He repeated O'Keefe's accusation that appraiserships were "sold" and that appraisers were "shaken down" for campaign contributions. In a speech in Sacramento he blasted Cranston for "taking contributions from appraisers that range up to thousands of dollars each." "The rumors are out," he asserted, "that each appraiser has been assessed a definite amount for the Cranston campaign."[4]

Furthermore, Cranston was accused of "corrupting" the California Democratic Council by giving lucrative political jobs to two of its top officers and to the husband of a third. It was pointed out that one CDC Vice President, the husband of another and the Treasurer of the organization had been appointed tax appraisers by Cranston. Salinger questioned whether this might have influenced CDC's endorsement of Cranston. "When you are grossing $10,000 to $45,000 a year from a part-time job and you hold that job at the pleasure of the state Con-

[2] California, Assembly, Interim Committee Reports, 1963-65. Vol. 21, No. 13, *State Inheritance Tax Appraising*, Sacramento, 1965.

[3] Mimeographed news release from the office of Senator Jack Schrade.

[4] Woodland *Democrat*, May 22, 1964.

troller and the Controller asks for your endorsement, it is a little difficult to consider his qualifications on their merits."[5]

"Smear and gutter politics," cried Cranston's friends. They pointed out that O'Keefe's charges referred to events that allegedly happened six years earlier, and they denounced Speaker Unruh for masterminding this "incredibly obvious political hoax" in order to defeat Cranston. O'Keefe was a close political associate of Unruh, and before publicizing his charges against Cranston, he discussed them with the Speaker. It was reported that at Unruh's suggestion he brought the matter to the attention of Senator Schrade.[6]

Unruh countered the attack on him by calling the appraiser system "the most single corrupting influence in California" politics and said that appraisers were being "unmercifully gouged" to support Cranston's campaign "if not by Mr. Cranston then by his chief bag man."[7] One legislator supporting Cranston declared his surprise at the Speaker's sudden alarm at corrupting influences "coming as it does from the one member of the legislature who has done the most to prevent passage of election and campaign reporting laws." He wanted to know, also, if Salinger was getting any help from Unruh's "slush funds" consisting of contributions collected by the Speaker from lobbyists. Unruh replied that he would be willing to debate the issue of "political slush funds" with Cranston and that he would be "happy to disclose the sources of his campaign funds if he [Cranston] is willing to disclose his."[8]

Cranston called these attacks deceitful and dishonest and vigorously denied that appraiserships were for sale. He admitted that appraisers contributed to his campaign, as they had done to the campaigns of his predecessors and other political candidates, but he said he had no idea how much any appraiser gave. Also, he maintained it was false to assert that pressure had been applied. "I do not discuss contributions with them. No one has any instructions or guidance from me. Its up to them to decide. I know that in two previous campaigns something like 20 percent were not listed among my contributors."[9] In order to deny the charges even more emphatically, Cranston filed a two million dollar libel suit against Salinger, Don Bradley and John O'Keefe. He charged that his reputation had willfully been maligned by them and they made "false, malicious inflammatory statements in an effort to influence the outcome of the June 2 primary." Salinger greeted the

[5] San Francisco *Chronicle,* May 21, 1964.
[6] Sacramento *Bee,* May 22, 1964.
[7] Woodland *Democrat,* May 22, 1964.
[8] San Francisco *Chronicle,* May 22, 1964.
[9] San Francisco *Chronicle,* May 21, 1964.

libel action with derision and said it was a "two million dollar smokescreen to hide the activities of the ITA's."[10]

A television debate climaxed the long and bitter campaign between the two contenders. The debate was a disappointment to most observers since neither candidate spent much time discussing serious issues. Most of the hour went to rehashing the personal charges and counter charges. The hottest exchange came on questions about appraisers' contributions, but nothing was added to clarify the issue. Although the debate did little to enlighten the voter, most experts believed it helped Salinger because he was able to project a more favorable image than his opponent.

The two candidates were fairly evenly matched and public opinion polls indicated the outcome rested with the undecided voters. For example, Opinion Research of California, an independent polling organization, reported in the last week of the campaign that nearly one-third of the Democratic voters had not yet made up their minds how they were going to vote.[11] With such a large bloc of undecided voters, the experts were badly divided over who would be the winner. Some predicted that Cranston would win because he had the Democratic organization behind him and could turn out his supporters on election day. Other experts predicted Salinger's victory, feeling that his personality would be decisive with a large number of undecided voters. He received some vital assistance in the last days of the campaign when Senator Engle's brother and his widow announced their support. Mrs. John F. Kennedy, though avoiding any open endorsement of Salinger, released a statement to the press warmly praising him and noting that he had been very close to her husband. Finally, Attorney General Mosk and Speaker Unruh both admitted they would vote for Salinger, indicating their supporters would be working for him.

Pierre Salinger defeated Alan Cranston by a vote of 1,177,517 to 1,037,748. Though Cranston was able to carry 42 of the state's 58 counties, Salinger scored his victory in Southern California, particularly in Los Angeles County, which he carried by 165,000 votes, thus confirming the decision to concentrate campaign activities in this area.

It was generally concluded that Salinger's victory was due greatly to the Kennedy image. Salinger was strong in areas which included Negroes and Mexican-Americans, two groups that voted strongly for President Kennedy. The election demonstrated again the weakness of the formal party organization and the independent nature of the Cali-

[10] At Cranston's request the Superior Court, in March 1965, dismissed the libel suit "without prejudice."

[11] New York *Times,* May 21, 1964.

fornia voter. Cranston, with the support of Governor Brown and most of the Democratic party establishment, was unable to turn back Salinger's challenge. The election, too, was a setback for the CDC and the volunteer political movement. CDC for the first time was unable to nominate its endorsed candidate in a statewide primary. Some felt that this was a victory for Jesse Unruh, who had opposed CDC's practice of pre-primary endorsements.

With these highlights of the campaign as background, we can now turn to an examination of the role of money in the primary. We begin with a discussion of the role money played in narrowing the field of candidates and then discuss the specifics of the financing of the Salinger and Cranston campaigns.

III. NARROWING THE FIELD OF CANDIDATES

Nominating candidates for public office is a major activity of a political party; in fact, some students of politics maintain that it is the most crucial activity because control rests with those who control the nominating process.[1] Various methods of nomination have been used by the parties over the years, but today the most widely used method in the states is the direct primary. Early-day advocates of the primary hoped that it would democratize the nomination process by taking the power to select the party's nominees from the "bosses" and placing it in the hands of the rank and file. Certainly the direct primary offers the opportunity for wider participation in the nomination decision, but it has not completely eliminated the influence of a party elite on nominations. Although the rank-and-file members ultimately select the party's nominee in the primary, before this choice can be made the field of candidates has already been reduced to a few serious contenders. In other words, even before the party member can exercise his power, some pre-primary screening of candidates has taken place. It is at this point that certain powerful individuals have the most influence in the nominating decision.

Very little is known about this screening process. It is unstructured and informal, conducted privately among people who prefer to remain anonymous. As a result, it is difficult to know what goes on during these negotiations or what inducements or sanctions are used to persuade someone to run or not to run for office. Yet, because of the importance of campaign funds, it is generally felt that money plays an important role in these negotiations. Indeed, Heard suggests that

[1] Austin Ranney and Willmore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956), p. 268. E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1942), p. 100.

"money probably has its greatest impact on the choice of public officials in the shadow land of our politics where it is decided who will be a candidate for a party's nomination and who will not."[2] It is popularly felt that those who control the purse strings have the most to say about who can run for public office.

Yet the importance of money in the pre-primary screening process can be exaggerated. The direct primary is open to any legally qualified person willing to pay a filing fee, and no one can be denied a place on the ballot by some financial king-maker. The final decision rests with the individual. Running for office is a calculated risk, and a potential candidate must consider all the factors that might conceivably affect his chances of nomination. The availability of campaign funds is obviously an important consideration for most people, but money alone cannot win elections and other resources are needed to ensure victory. The role of money can be appreciated best when viewed in the total context of all the factors that bear on the decision to run. For analytical purposes, three broad categories of factors affect individual decisions to seek a nomination to public office: (1) personal resources and considerations; (2) the political situation, potential support and alliances; (3) availability and access to campaign funds.

Personal resources and considerations include those factors peculiar to the candidate because of his personality, status or situation. This category would consist of the candidate's personal abilities and assets or lack of them, including his public image and reputation, his platform manner and speaking ability, his personal ambitions and capabilities, and his experience and record in public office. The political factors to be considered involve relations with his party, the factional situation within that party, and the stakes in the nomination for important party leaders. This category includes the candidate's assessment of his strength with extra-legal party groups, which in California engage in pre-primary endorsing. In addition, the potential support of newspapers may be politically significant. Identification or alliance with interest groups may be another consideration. For anyone seeking a Democratic nomination the crucial groups in California are organized labor, ethnic groups—particularly Negroes and Mexican-Americans—and ideological groups of a liberal persuasion. The last analytical category includes those factors that impinge on the availability of campaign funds. These considerations are important to all but the few fortunate candidates with adequate personal funds to finance their campaigns. Most potential candidates must obtain access to the interests or to individuals who can put up the money.

[2] Heard, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

None of these factors are independent of each other. They interrelate in such a way that it is difficult to know the relative importance of each. For instance, campaign costs may be high because of a competitive primary resulting from a factionally divided party unable to agree on a candidate. Or the political endorsement of a candidate by an extra-legal or interest group may mean direct financial assistance to the candidate. Thus a potential candidate's risk decision is a complicated balance of many interrelated factors, and money must be seen in the total context.

The 1964 Democratic senatorial primary provides a fascinating case study of the role of money in winnowing candidates for office. Twelve candidates were listed on the ballot, but approximately another dozen individuals were mentioned in newspapers as possible contenders for the nomination. If it is understandable why so many were interested in running for so important an office, it is less certain how this large field of candidates was reduced to only two serious contenders. Eight of the candidates on the ballot had no chance of winning; two others —Clair Engle and George McLain—were nominal candidates, leaving only Pierre Salinger and Alan Cranston as serious contenders. Of those frequently mentioned as possible candidates who failed to file, only James Roosevelt and Stanley Mosk came near declaring their candidacy.

For the record the eight "frivolous" candidates who filed were: Emanuel Braude, Walter Buchanan, Demos Cordeiro, Harold Fields, Lynn Johnston, Henry Mermel, Mark Morris and Guido Pavia. This was a mixed group—an electrician, a teacher, two farmers, a realtor, a pharmacist and a brace of lawyers—about which one cannot generalize. Their stated reasons for running were personal and idiosyncratic. For example, Mr. Mermel outlined his interest in the office as follows: "My program does not cancel, repeal, or abolish the present tax system. . . . After six years of careful study . . . I developed a new and very unique income control device by meter system which will close all loopholes in the collection of taxes." All that can be said about the group with any certainty was that they did not have the slightest chance of winning.

Although George McLain doesn't quite fit this category, he probably never seriously expected to win. McLain, a pension promotor, with a penchant for being a candidate, seemed to run for office as a means of promoting the interests of his "old folks" lobby. Still, because of the past importance of pension politics, one could not completely dismiss McLain as a frivolous candidate.[3]

[3] For an insightful study of McLain and pension politics in California see: Frank A. Pinner, Paul Jacobs, Philip Selznick, *Old Age and Political Behavior*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), passim.

In assessing the part money played in the decision to withdraw from the race, we shall consider the three leading candidates—Engle, Roosevelt, and Mosk—who thought about running, but eventually withdrew.[4]

Engle Withdraws

The road to renomination was wide open for Clair Engle until illness cast a shadow across his political future. Senator Engle spent most of his adult life in a public career. Immediately following graduation from the University of California Law School in 1933, he became the District Attorney of Tehama County, in northern California. He became more active in Democratic politics and in 1942 he was elected to the California State Senate. He remained in the State Senate less than a year, however, and in a special election in 1943 the voters sent him to the U.S. House of Representatives from the sprawling mountain-valley 2nd district. He served in the House for fifteen years until he decided to run for the United States Senate in 1958. A number of factors—a divided Republican party, strong labor opposition to a right-to-work proposition, and the end of cross-filing—helped Engle in his campaign for the Senate and he easily defeated his reluctant opponent, Governor Goodwin Knight.

While serving in the House of Representatives, Engle was appointed to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. He specialized in water and resource problems and by hard work and the grace of seniority became chairman of the committee. This assignment, of course, was one of great power and one most coveted by a Congressman, particularly from the Far West, where federal appropriations for water development play an important role in the growth of the area. When Engle moved to the Senate his interests necessarily broadened, but he remained primarily concerned with resources policy. He often claimed that his greatest accomplishment in public life was the implementation and continued expansion of the giant Central Valley Project of California.

Engle seemed happy with his life in the Senate and his great ambition was to get re-elected. He was committed to public life and he had no other career interests. A friendly, outgoing person who projected a folksy image which appealed to the electorate, he was a kind of stump speaker known for his humorous rural tales. Since his whole life had been spent in public service, he had no personal wealth. He

[4] There were other potential candidates who toyed with the idea of running, and if they had chosen to do so would have been serious contenders. (e.g., Sam Yorty, Mayor of Los Angeles). However, none went far enough in their decisions to permit public discussion here.

was married to Lucretia Caldwell, a strong-minded woman, who had at one time been his secretary and who continued a deep involvement in his career.

After the announcement of Engle's operation in August 1963, rumors concerning his health ran rampant. Brain surgery was a serious matter, but no one knew the cause of the surgery or whether it might affect his ability to run for re-election. At this time Mrs. Engle was in complete control of the Senator's affairs. For reasons of her own she shielded the Senator from visitors and permitted no one to see him for almost four months. She also placed a news blackout on medical reports of his condition and prevented the Senator's doctor and staff from discussing his health. She denied that the Senator had a brain tumor and periodically reported he was recuperating satisfactorily.

After Engle declared in December his intention to seek re-election, the state party leadership demanded a chance to see him. Mrs. Engle finally relented and a number of party leaders visited the Senator in mid-January. They found the Senator a mere shadow of his former self, and came away shocked by the experience. He was able to speak only with great difficulty, one arm was in a sling, and he limped badly. Governor Brown, State Chairman Eugene Wyman, Northern Chairman Roger Kent and National Committeewoman Elizabeth Gatov agreed that if the Senator was to have the united support of the party in the primary, he must present medical proof of his ability to campaign vigorously. Mrs. Engle promised them that such medical evidence would be forthcoming.

As Mrs. Engle promised, the Senator's physician issued a statement on January 22, 1964, in which he noted that "it can be assumed his (Engle) recovery is proceeding on schedule and will continue henceforth on an accelerated basis." The doctor went on to say ". . . upon this assumption we feel certain that the Senator will be fully able to take on the active phases of his election campaign." He ended by declaring that it would be impossible to meet the request of California Democratic leaders to make public "full medical facts, including all relevant medical records" because this would violate medical ethics.[5]

All of Engle's political calculations were upset by his illness. Before his surgery he expected the full backing of the Democratic party leadership in his bid for a second term. Though anyone could have challenged him in the direct primary, it was unlikely that any serious contenders would have come forth had his health remained good. The first indication that his illness had changed the political situation came when Dan Kimball refused to serve as his campaign manager. Kimball was a highly respected industrialist, who had served as Pres-

[5] New York *Times,* January 23, 1964.

ident Truman's Secretary of the Navy, and who was still influential in Democratic politics and fund raising. He had been Engle's campaign chairman in 1958 and he would have been again if he thought Engle was well enough to undergo a campaign. But he felt otherwise and recommended that Engle resign from the Senate in order to preserve his health.

Further evidence of Engle's growing difficulties came when the Democratic State Central Committee refused to accept the report on his medical condition, and in effect threw open the Democratic primary by declaring that "those not satisfied with the report can get into the race." A number of candidates made no further secret of their interest in Engle's job. The motivation of the party leadership was clear; the stakes were too high to take a chance on an ailing candidate. They believed California needed a Democratic Senator and they could not chance losing the seat. They reasoned that even though Engle might win the nomination he could not wage an effective campaign against a Republican opponent and he would lose in the general election. And if he were able to win the election, they feared he could not provide the leadership and effectiveness the state needed in the Senate. Members of the California Democratic delegation in the House of Representatives had complained they were unable to get assistance on matters vital to the state from Engle's office.

Engle's political base began to disappear. There were, however, a number of people who continued to support his candidacy, mostly state legislators from the northern part of the state. Engle managed to put together a campaign organization headed by Assemblyman Thomas Carrell. Among the state legislators who stayed with Engle after the Central Committee opened the primary, were a number of assemblymen closely identified with Speaker Unruh. It was no secret that Unruh was not happy with Governor Brown's candidate, Alan Cranston. He had quietly encouraged Stanley Mosk to enter the primary, and after failing at this, encouraged his people to stay with Engle, while he remained publicly neutral.

In 1958, Engle had been able to garner the pre-primary endorsement of the CDC whose support would be necessary again, particularly in a contested primary. He valiantly tried to hold his support in the CDC by a telephone appeal to the endorsing convention, but his inability to complete a simple sentence finished whatever chance he might have had. Another element of his 1958 winning coalition consisted of organized labor. He sought the endorsement of the Council on Political Education, the political arm of the state Labor Federation, and again he lost to Alan Cranston. To those who argued that Engle had always been a good friend of labor, they were told:

> He cannot serve in the Senate. This is not a matter of being compassionate. We have a duty to organized labor to support the best candidate who has a chance to win . . . he will be torn to pieces if he tries to make a campaign.[6]

Engle would normally have had little trouble in raising money for his primary campaign. His incumbency gave him special advantages in fund raising. Any economic interest regulated, assisted or controlled by the federal government may be considered a prime source for an incumbent's campaign funds. For example, the aerospace industry, which does practically all its business with the federal government, is reportedly a good source of funds for an incumbent Senator from California. These interests may want access to a Senator when matters of vital importance affecting them comes before the federal government. An incumbent is also in an excellent position to collect from those he has served in the past. The campaign also would have been a relatively inexpensive affair if Engle had the united support of his party for the renomination.

Senator Engle appointed Mark Boyar, a Los Angeles industrialist, as his finance chairman. Boyar was an experienced Democratic fund raiser in the state and would have had no trouble raising funds for a healthy candidate. Yet it soon became clear that it was very difficult to raise funds for a sick Senator. Engle's fortunes rose and fell with the reports of his health. In order to shore up his faltering campaign, Engle attempted in early April to make his first Senate speech since his operation. The results were a disaster, the only word the ailing Senator could utter was a long-drawn "A . . ." He needed assistance to introduce a bill. Following this tragic episode new stories appeared reporting that some of Engle's financial supporters had withdrawn their help. In the words of one observer: "I have heard rumors of his backers disengaging themselves out of the belief he can not serve effectively. I think it is pretty obvious that big money is smart money and it will not go to Engle."

An interesting facet of the role of money in the Engle story concerned reports of job offers made to the Senator. In the latter part of April a news story quoted Dan Kimball as saying that job offers had been made to Engle conditional upon his withdrawal from the race. The story went on to report that the ailing Senator had been offered "a $25,000 a year position arranged for him by California Democratic leaders who hoped thus to lure him out of the already feverish race. . . ."[7] The job was to be either with a utility company or with a State government department and it included the employment of Mrs.

[6] Sacramento *Bee,* April 9, 1964.
[7] San Francisco *Chronicle,* April 24, 1964.

Engle as an assistant. Supposedly these offers were made to guarantee Engle a living if he left the Senate for health reasons. It seems quite likely that some attempt was made to ease Engle out of the race in this manner. But since a state job offer could conceivably have violated state laws, the Governor and others denied the effort had ever been made.

Engle's struggle to stay in the primary finally ended when he entered the hospital for the second time on April 23. It was impossible to keep up the pretense and with deep regret the Senator withdrew from the race declaring "my health will not permit me to campaign." Though he released his supporters, it was too late for his name to be removed from the ballot. Thus he received 119,000 votes, not quite enough to have changed the outcome of the primary. After the campaign his finance chairman reported that he had received $24,000 in contributions and that a little over $23,000 had been spent on the campaign.

It is evident that money played an unimportant role in Engle's decision to withdraw from the primary. He had run into some financial difficulties, and if he had stayed in the race, he probably would have been hard-pressed for money to run a primary campaign. However, the crucial factor in his losing battle to gain the nomination was his health. He could not have raised the money because people knew that he could not campaign and that he would be defeated if he had tried to run.

Roosevelt Fails to get Support

James Roosevelt was another hopeful who gave serious thought to running in the primary. He was less involved in maneuvering for the nomination than the other contenders, but he did challenge Alan Cranston for the CDC endorsement. The factors that influenced his thinking on the nomination can be sketched quickly.

James Roosevelt, the eldest son of Franklin D. Roosevelt, was born in New York City in 1907. He attended Harvard College and after graduation became his father's personal aide. He moved to California in 1938 and after the Second World War established an insurance brokerage firm in Los Angeles. Quite naturally he got involved in Democratic politics and served for a few years as Chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee. In 1950, when the Democrats were searching for someone to challenge Earl Warren for Governor, Roosevelt reluctantly "volunteered." He was no match for Warren and he was defeated by a 2 to 1 margin, losing every county in the state. In 1954 he was elected to the House of Representatives from the 26th Congressional District, a district containing part of central Los Angeles

and Culver City with a high proportion of low income Negroes along with Beverly Hills and its wealthy denizens. In the 10 years he served in the House, Roosevelt established himself as a strong liberal supporting such proposals as a fair employment practices commission and voting against appropriations for the House Un-American Activities Committee.

By 1964 his career was at a standstill. He was a member of the House Education and Labor Committee, but under the seniority system he had little chance of moving to the chairmanship. He had indicated to friends that he was not particularly satisfied with his career in the House and was getting restless to move on. News stories reported that he was interested in the governorship if Pat Brown retired after his second term of office. So when it appeared that Senator Engle might not be able to run for re-election, Roosevelt sensed a golden opportunity. On the day the Democratic State Central Committee opened the primary, he announced that he might run for the Senate but said that he would defer a final decision for several weeks. By so doing, he launched a trial balloon.

Roosevelt entered the race entirely on his own. Apparently he was involved in no alliances and he had no commitments from any major factional leaders. He had few known enemies, but his only tangible assets were the Roosevelt name and his public image. His ambition pushed him on, but he was encouraged also by a secret poll that showed him as a leading candidate for the Senate in Southern California.

His basic strategy was quite simple. It involved the rallying of the liberal and labor interests to his cause. His main chance was to win the CDC endorsement or at least to show so well at the convention that he could muster support from other quarters. Accordingly he sent a letter to CDC officers declaring his interest in the Senate and his desire to meet with them and other CDC groups.

The twelfth annual convention of the California Democratic Council convened on February 21, 1964, in Long Beach, California. There were 4,000 delegates and alternates in attendance at the largest political gathering in the United States other than the quadrennial national convention of the major parties. The principal item of business consisted of the endorsement of a candidate for the United States Senate. All of the covert machinations of various senatorial aspirants were apparent at the convention. The endorsement battle began with the preliminary skirmish over the rules of the convention. Supporters of Senator Engle and Attorney General Mosk wished to modify the convention rules to require a majority of all delegates, rather than just a majority of those present and voting, to endorse. Also, they sought to

change the rules so that the delegates could vote not to endorse or to endorse more than one candidate if the convention so determined. This attempt to change the rules was beaten down by Cranston and Roosevelt supporters.

The names placed before the convention for the pre-primary endorsement of CDC included Clair Engle, Alan Cranston, James Roosevelt, George McLain and an unknown named Harold Fields. The convention received their nominations with all the ballyhoo of a national nominating convention and the supporters of each candidate provided a rousing ovation and a placard-studded parade.

Though the names of five persons were placed before the convention, the race for the endorsement was actually between Alan Cranston and James Roosevelt. Roosevelt did well, considering that he ran against one of the founders and the first president of the group. Despite his liberal record, he had never been an insider in CDC affairs and he had no assured basis of support in the organization other than his own club in Beverly Hills. Yet he was aggressively active among the delegates and impressed a number of people with his personality and speaking ability. The first ballot showed Cranston the winner of CDC's endorsement for the Democratic nomination for the United States Senate by the following vote: Cranston 1,197, Roosevelt 727, Engle 281, McLain 166, Fields 1. Even though Roosevelt lost he gained friends in the CDC movement who could be very useful in any future political venture.

Following his defeat, Roosevelt met privately with Stanley Mosk and with Jesse Unruh. There were conflicting reports on the purpose of this meeting. Some said Roosevelt was seeking the support of the Speaker so that he could stay in the race, while others said Mosk arranged the meeting for the purpose of determining Roosevelt's future plans. Roosevelt's plans, however, were made abundantly clear when he disclosed that he had decided to withdraw from the race. The next day he announced publicly his intention to support Alan Cranston for the Senate.

In all these maneuverings money was never a serious factor in Roosevelt's actions. He was not naive enough to dismiss money, yet his plans were to get money after he had established some kind of political backing. He hoped that by establishing a strong basis for his candidacy he would convince the right people of his chances of victory and then the money would be made available. But he failed to capture the endorsement of CDC, which would have been the basis of his electoral coalition. By withdrawing he hoped to store up some good will in this organization and leave the door open for future political office.

Mosk Declines to Enter the Race

Stanley Mosk was another potential candidate for the Senate who decided that the risk was not worth taking. Following Engle's illness Mosk was constantly mentioned as a candidate and he indicated a number of times that he was seriously considering running. Yet he eventually announced he would not run and cited the high cost of campaigning as his reason for withdrawing. Here, apparently, was an excellent example of the power of money, but let us examine his risk calculations more carefully.

Mosk's political career began in 1939, when he became Executive Secretary to Governor Olson, the first Democratic Governor since the turn of the century. He was born in Texas, educated at the University of Texas and took a law degree at the University of Chicago. He migrated to California in 1932 and established a law practice in the Los Angeles area. Olson's administration was a turbulent one and he was defeated for re-election, but before his term ended he appointed Mosk to the Los Angeles Superior Court. Mosk served on this court for 16 years and gained considerable respect for his judicial abilities. In 1958 the Democrats selected Mosk as their candidate for Attorney General. He won along with the rest of the ticket and in 1962 was returned for a second term.

Mosk was committed to a public career even though he could have been a successful lawyer in private practice. He possessed one of the finest legal minds in the state and was highly regarded as both a judge and Attorney General. An effective speaker who appeared frequently before groups, he was the highest ranking Jew in the state service and was very popular with his co-religionists. He was liberal in politics and a strong advocate of civil rights. He was married to the former Edna Mitchell, a person of considerable talent, and a most effective fund raiser for her husband.

As to his future plans it was apparent that Mosk wanted to be something more than Attorney General. He was still a fairly young man and ambitious. He was frequently mentioned as a possible successor to Governor Brown, but he had also been suggested as a potential appointee to the California Supreme Court. It was generally thought that a vacancy would soon appear on this court and that Mosk would be a leading contender. Mosk apparently had mixed feelings as to whether he wanted a political or judicial career.

Mosk's behavior during this pre-primary period was somewhat unusual. He was evidently under great strain, for he procrastinated in making his decision. He maintained publicly, of course, that his indecision resulted from his concern over Engle's health, yet he was as

convinced as other Democratic leaders that Engle was unable to run for re-election.

As the seriousness of Engle's illness became evident, Mosk was in a fairly strong position to capture the nomination. Public opinion polls indicated he was the leading contender for Engle's seat. The California Poll (Field) reported in late 1963 that Mosk had 30 percent, Engle 20 percent, and Cranston 7 percent of the declared Democratic vote. Three months later, in January 1964, the same poll showed Mosk receiving 34 percent of the vote as against Engle's 27 percent and Cranston's 11 percent. Mosk could also look forward to strong political support from within the Democratic party. He had a wide political base that he built up since 1958, and had strong backing from liberal elements of the party in Southern California. In past campaigns he had received the endorsements of CDC and organized labor. And he expected to obtain the powerful support of Speaker Unruh.

With all of these things in his favor, people began to wonder why Mosk hesitated in announcing his intentions. They were further confused by his refusal to have his name placed before the CDC convention. If he were to run for the nomination, it was expected he would seek this group's endorsement as he had in earlier campaigns. But to some people Mosk's refusal to try for the CDC endorsement made sense, since it would be a tough battle against Alan Cranston and James Roosevelt. Cranston obviously had the edge and Roosevelt would be competing with Mosk for support among Southern delegates. Moreover, Mosk's relationship with Speaker Unruh would lose him important friends among grass roots Democrats. Finally, if Mosk did fail to obtain CDC's endorsement, he would further alienate the group by staying in the race against their chosen candidate.

On February 29, 1964, Earl Behrens, the reliable political editor of the San Francisco *Chronicle*, reported that Attorney General Mosk "according to intimates" was scheduled shortly to announce his candidacy for the United States Senate. The Attorney General's office had arranged press conferences in Los Angeles and San Francisco on March 4, 1964 to make an important announcement. Events took an unexpected turn when the Attorney General at the press conference announced that he had decided not to run for the Senate. Citing money as the reason for his withdrawal, Mosk said "I am unwilling to impose on my personal friends to give and raise that tremendous sum of money." To show how far his plans had gone and how carefully he had considered running, the Attorney General provided a breakdown of the estimated cost of his campaign. They were as follows:

Television	$203,960
Outdoor Advertising	105,200
Newspapers	93,000
Literature and Mailing	90,000
Headquarters and Personnel	83,000
Radio	53,000
Total	$628,160

This itemization of proposed expenditures could only have been made by professionals charged with planning an actual campaign.

Mosk intimated, however, that other factors had played a role in his decision not to run for the Senate. Mosk informed the reporters that Governor Brown had requested "in the interest of party unity" that he not run. Brown later confirmed that he had done so and he explained his actions in the following words:

> He felt that it wouldn't be good for the Democratic Party to have two Democrats at each others throats for the next three or four months and I think Alan Cranston will make a good United States Senator . . . Cranston has gotten off to a pretty good start by the California Democratic Council endorsement, and then the withdrawal of James Roosevelt in his favor. . . . A Cranston-Mosk fight could result in the disintegration of some of the Party unity we have had in this state. . . .[8]

The Governor's action in the pre-primary maneuvering demands some explanation. At first his only concern was that Engle's illness not jeopardize the Democratic party's chance of holding the Senate seat, and when the party leaders decided they could not stick with Engle, Brown indicated he would be neutral in the primary. He talked about the open primary and the right of all comers to seek the office. His attitude changed, however, and he began to take a more active role in choosing a senatorial candidate. The reasons for this change of heart were interrelated with some wider considerations involving the Governor's changing perspective on his role as party leader.

The close association of Pat Brown with former Governor Earl Warren shaped and colored his conception of political leadership. Though Brown was a Democrat, he served as Attorney General in Warren's administration, and the two men admired each other and were fast friends. Warren was one of the most successful politicians in California's history; he had managed to win election three times by increasing margins and to do so while running as the candidate of a minority party. Warren realized rightfully that he could not win

[8] San Francisco *Chronicle,* March 4, 1964.

simply as a Republican but that he had to develop a political style which made an appeal across party lines. He revived the non-partisan tradition of the earlier Republican progressives and developed a broad appeal to all regardless of party.

To play down partisanship in such a way was a logical act for a governor of a minority party, but for a Democratic governor this style of leadership made less sense. When Brown won the governorship in 1958 he continued to act in the non-partisan spirit of Earl Warren. He tended to neglect his role as Democratic party leader so that he could emphasize his wider role as Governor of all the people. A vacuum in politics is an impossibility and if Brown chose not to exercise political power others did. One person who understood political power and its importance was Speaker Unruh. After Brown's rather confusing leadership of the California Democratic delegation at the 1960 presidential nominating convention, President Kennedy turned to Unruh as his political lieutenant in the state. During the Kennedy years Unruh continued to grow in power. He consolidated his hold over the legislature, challenged the role of CDC in the Democratic party and finally challenged the power of the Governor himself. Needless to say, this was enough to force the Governor to reevaluate his conception of political leadership and in 1963 he surrounded himself with a group of more sophisticated political advisors.

With this background, it becomes clear why the Governor began to take a stronger role in choosing a successor to Engle. He was content, at first, to let events take their natural course and for various candidates to battle in a free and open primary. However, when he discovered that the Speaker was not going to sit back and leave things to chance, but was pushing Mosk, the Governor resented the Speaker's move. Brown decided that if anyone was going to be a senatorial kingmaker he should be that man. Moreover, he was eager to improve his image as political leader with the Johnson administration and to prevent the renewal of the alliance Unruh had with Washington during the Kennedy years.

The Governor decided that he would support Alan Cranston for the Senate and that he would try to get Mosk out of the race. The Governor's choice of Cranston over Mosk was related to the latter's alliance with Unruh and to Brown's personal preference for Cranston. There was something about Stanley Mosk that troubled the Governor and he harbored some reservations about him as a Senator.

How the Governor moved to get Mosk out of the race is not entirely clear. From Mosk's behavior there is every indication that "pressures" were applied if not by the Governor then by others. Mosk pointed out that "the Governor's feelings that there ought not to be a primary did

get across to many people in the Democratic party who, in turn, urged me not to run." There are indications, too, that some of these people might have been potential contributors to Mosk's campaign. For instance the Los Angeles *Times* carried the following item after Mosk's withdrawal: "From other sources the Times learned that at least eight prominent Democrats—most of them big money contributors—called Mosk to say they couldn't support him anymore because of pressure from Brown."[9] In addition the New York *Times* reported on Mosk's withdrawal that, "it appears that some major sources of financial support were demurring at commitments to Mr. Mosk."[10] It has, also, been conjectured that Mosk agreed to party demands to get out of the race to improve his chances for the long coveted State Supreme Court justiceship. It is worth noting that in August, 1964, Governor Brown appointed Stanley Mosk to the California Supreme Court.

In conclusion, can we say that money was the factor that forced Mosk out of the race? It appears that financial considerations were important since a few large potential contributors apparently applied pressure on Mosk to withdraw from the race. Yet the situation was much more complicated and it seems likely that money alone could not have squeezed the Attorney General out. There are indications that Mosk's political support was slipping badly and that he might have been intimidated by signs that he would lose in the primary and be left in political limbo. He lost the CDC's support to Cranston, and there were indications that organized labor was moving in Cranston's direction as well. The Governor was opposed to Mosk, and he had little factional support in the party other than from Speaker Unruh. And there was some doubt as to whether Unruh would have backed Mosk completely.

It appears that if Mosk had the necessary confidence in his ability to win, he could have raised the needed funds. In the past he had been able to raise enough money for effective campaigns. For example, in his 1958 campaign he raised $270,000 and in 1962 he raised $350,000.[11] Indeed in 1962, while other candidates went begging for additional funds, Mosk had a surplus. Though some sources might have been persuaded not to contribute to Mosk's campaign, many were emotionally committed to the Attorney General and would have supported him under most circumstances. Many of Mosk's largest contributors were wealthy Jews who liked Mosk because he was liberal, and took great pride in the fact that he was a Jew. It seems that Mosk decided

[9] Los Angeles *Times,* March 5, 1964.

[10] New York *Times,* March 4, 1964.

[11] These figures appear in Mosk's campaign finance reports filed with the Secretary of State in Sacramento, California.

not to run because he had serious doubts that he could win in a contested primary.

From this analysis of the part money played in narrowing the field of candidates in the Democratic primary, we conclude that money alone cannot explain why any candidates withdrew from the race. In every case factors other than money made the individual feel that the risks of seeking the nomination would be too great. Furthermore, though money was an important element in the calculations of each, in no instance was it the crucial or determinative consideration.

In Engle's case, money could not have changed his decision to get out of the race. Once it was apparent that he was too ill to win, his political support collapsed and he was left with no alternative but to withdraw. James Roosevelt wasn't much concerned about money since his strategy was to establish first a strong foundation for his candidacy and then to seek funds. He reasoned, probably correctly, that there is always money available for anyone who can demonstrate political strength and good possibilities of winning. Finally, despite the fact Stanley Mosk mentioned campaign funds as the reason for his withdrawal, it is clear that there were more important and persuasive reasons which induced him to get out of the race. Mosk withdrew from the race because of pressure from the Governor, the lack of vital political support of CDC and organized labor, and his concern that a primary defeat would jeopardize his future. In short, he feared his chances of victory were too uncertain to risk entering a costly and competitive primary race.

This case study demonstrates that the importance of money in the pre-primary screening process can be fully understood only when viewed in the full context of all the political and personal factors. Too frequently, the power of money is exaggerated because people tend to examine the question of money divorced from the wider political dynamics.

IV. THE COSTS OF THE CAMPAIGNS

It is difficult to determine the cost of a political campaign in California, for there is no exact accounting required by law. Any attempt to total costs involves a great deal of estimating. Even candidates and campaign managers do not know the real cost of most campaigns. Mostly they know what the committees under their control spent directly, but there are many intangible costs that are hard to calculate, and in statewide campaigns there are other committees spending money unknown to them. Sometimes, too, a candidate prefers not to

know about the financing of his campaign, for the reason that ignorance leaves him innocent of any wrongdoing. So before discussing the costs of the senatorial campaigns some explanation of the data used in this study and their limitations is in order.

The principal sources of information on California campaign costs are the financial reports required by the Purity of Elections Law. This law provides that every candidate and political committee file with the Secretary of State a statement of receipts and expenditures made in a primary or general election campaign.[1] Expenditure reports contain a summary of the amounts raised and spent, with a listing of the individuals who contributed the money, and an itemized breakdown of the expenditures made. There is no specification of the amount of money contributed by any individual since the law has been interpreted to require only a listing of the names of those who give. Although the law prohibits certain types of expenditures, since 1949 there has been no limitation on the overall amount of money that can be spent. It should be noted, also, that the federal law limiting expenditures of federal candidates applies only to spending in a general election. Thus, there is no legal limit on the amount of money that can be spent in a senatorial primary in California.

Reports, though useful, provide only a partial picture of all the costs of a campaign. They reveal the amount of money spent by statewide committees but there are always a number of local groups raising and spending funds. In most cases local committees fail to report their financial activities, but in a primary there are fewer of these committees and they are probably of less importance than in a general election. A more serious limitation of the reports is that they reveal only direct monetary expenditures. Many services and facilities are donated to campaigns by individuals and organizations without any equated monetary value, and if these were translated into dollars and cents, they would add appreciably to costs. A candidate may be given, at no expense to his committee, the use of a meeting hall for a rally or workers whose salaries are paid for by some private employer. Such indirect assistance can take many forms and in order to get a true picture of the spending estimates must be made of the value of such help.

Another shortcoming of the reports arises from inadequate enforce-

[1] California was one of the first states to adopt a campaign expenditure report law in 1893. This law has been amended a number of times, with the most recent changes in 1949 and 1955. In 1949 limitations on the amount of money a candidate could spend were removed, and in 1955 the law was amended to require campaign expenditure reports from political committees for the primary as well as the general election. (See Elections Code, State of California, Secs. 11500-12302.)

ment of the reporting requirements. Although the law requires all candidates and committees to file statements, no serious efforts are made to ensure compliance. The Secretary of State has the authority to withhold from a candidate a certificate of nomination or election, if the candidate fails to file his expense statement, but he has seldom invoked this authority.[2] Even if comprehensive reporting takes place, there is question about the content of the reports. Since the Secretary of State only receives and files the reports and makes no official review of them, there is no way of knowing how honestly expenses are reported. In general, candidates are probably more honest about this than the loose enforcement of the law deserves, yet a certain amount of financial legerdemain undoubtedly occurs.

Reported and Real Costs

Granting the limitations in the expenditure reports, it is still possible to use them as the basis of a reasonable estimate of the total costs of the senatorial primary. Table I summarizes the information contained in the campaign finance reports filed with the Secretary of State. For comparative purposes, data on Republican candidates in the primary are also included.

Table I presents the direct costs of the campaigns as reported by the candidates. It shows that approximately $2 million was reported as spent, with the Democratic candidates out-spending the Republicans by 3 to 1. The greater Democratic spending was due, of course, to the more competitive nature of that party's primary. Alan Cranston spent the largest amount of money, reporting disbursements of $823,000. Among the Republicans the biggest spender was Leland Kaiser, who spent more than $450,000. Interestingly, both leading spenders failed to win their party's nomination, indicating that reported money alone doesn't win elections. Table I reveals also that the two major Democratic candidates ran up a combined debt of approximately $400,000. More will be said later about these deficits, for they led to a unique arrangement between the two candidates.

The expense reports reveal large amounts of money raised by loans. Of $700,000 Cranston collected for his campaign, $200,000 came in the form of loans co-signed by friends who were confident that Cranston would win and would be able to pay them off from money raised for the general election campaign. Cranston's defeat was quite a shock to them! Another loan was reported by Leland Kaiser, who borrowed

[2] A bill (A.B. 57) introduced by Assemblywoman Pauline Davis, requiring one-time candidates to have filed their campaign expenditure reports before being permitted to run again, was enacted into law by the 1965 legislature. (See: California *Statutes of 1965*, Chap. 46.)

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF REPORTED RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS
SENATORIAL PRIMARY 1964[a]

Candidates	*Receipts*	*Disbursements*	*Known Debt*
Democrats			
Salinger	$ 427,241	$ 477,007[b]	$ 50,070
Cranston	710,274[c]	823,307	332,377[d]
Engle	23,069	21,935	
McLain	5,618	20,643	15,025
Others	10,536	10,536	
Total Democrats	$1,176,738	$1,353,428	$ 397,472
Republicans			
Murphy	$ 101,428	$ 101,312	
Kaiser	455,169[e]	454,580	
Hall	8,734	8,661	
Total Republicans	$ 565,331	564,553	
Grand Total	$1,742,069	$1,917,981	$ 397,472

[a] Data derived from reports filed with California Secretary of State.

[b] It is likely that Salinger spent more than he reported here. According to a reliable source in the Salinger campaign, an additional $140,000 was not reported because bills came due after the reporting date.

[c] Includes $219, 343 reported as repayable loans.

[d] Derived by adding $219,343 of repayable loans to cash deficit.

[e] Includes $320,000 loan from Pacific National Bank reported as paid in full.

$320,000 from the Pacific National Bank. He obtained the money on his own credit to get his campaign under way and from the report it appears that he repaid the loan from his own resources. Kaiser, an independently wealthy man, apparently financed personally most of his campaign.

Table 2 contains estimates of the "real costs" of the campaigns for U. S. Senator, for both primary and general elections, and includes reported costs plus estimates of indirect expenditures. Estimates were derived from information provided by active participants in the campaigns; indirect expenditures total $350,000 for the primary and $250,000 for the general election. These significant amounts of money show the relative importance of indirect help in a campaign.[3] One of the most common forms of indirect assistance, and one that probably accounts for a significant part of the dollar value of such help, consists of wages and salaries paid to campaign employees. A private employer may carry campaign workers on his business payroll or release regular

[3] The Florida campaign finance law requires candidates to report any "services in lieu of cash contributions" received as well as direct monetary contributions. See: Elston Roady, "Ten Years of Florida's 'Who Gave It—Who Got It' law," *Law and Contemporary Society*, XXVII (Summer, 1962), p. 437.

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED REAL COSTS
U. S. SENATE RACE, 1964[a]

Candidates	Reported Disbursements	Indirect Assistance[b]	Total Costs
PRIMARY			
Cranston (Dem.)	$ 823,000	$ 177,000	$1,000,000
Salinger (Dem.)	478,000	150,000	628,000
Murphy (Rep.)	101,000	25,000	126,000
Others	516,000	none	516,000
Primary Costs			$2,270,000
GENERAL ELECTION			
Salinger (Dem.)	$ 491,000	$ 150,000	$ 641,000
Murphy (Rep.)	606,000	100,000	706,000
Election Costs			$1,347,000
Total Costs			$3,617,000

[a] Estimated real costs includes the reported expenditures to the Secretary of State plus an estimate of the dollar value of the indirect assisance.

[b] Indirect assistance is an estimate of the dollar value of goods and services contributed to the candidates, excluding volunteer labor.

employees to work in the campaign. The business manager of a firm owned by a Salinger supporter worked almost full-time on Salinger's campaign. A number of operatives in the Salinger campaign are known to have received part of their salary from a private employer. Cranston's campaign profited to some extent by personnel assistance too, mainly government employees who contributed their services. Since Cranston was Governor Brown's candidate, he obtained part-time and after-hours help from employees on the Governor's staff and in the Department of Finance. Where state employees devoted full-time to the Cranston campaign, however, they went on leaves of absence and were on the campaign payroll.

Indirect assistance may involve other than personnel services. Candidates always welcome the free use of automobiles or airplanes. In some campaigns a car dealer may be found who will loan automobiles free of charge to be used by the candidate and members of his staff. At one time or another both Salinger and Cranston had use of a private airplane donated by friends. Another common form of help involves private employers paying directly for campaign bills, e.g., there were reports of corporations providing stamps to cover mailing costs. And it was widely reported that Pierre Salinger received from the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco some free use of rooms and facilities.

The tax laws may have something to do with the growth of indirect

assistance in campaigns. Under California law, income tax deductions are allowed for political contributions of not more than $100 per year.[4] California is one of the four states providing tax incentives to encourage contributions, but a $100 deduction is small change for a large contributor. By writing off political contributions as business expenditures, however, a businessman obtains tax advantages not otherwise available.

Table 2 shows the real costs of the senatorial primary to be $2.3 million and that Alan Cranston topped all the other candidates with expenditures of $1 million.[5] Added to the $1.3 million estimated expenditures in the general election, a grand total of $3.6 million was spent to nominate and elect a United States Senator from California in 1964.

A Most Expensive Primary

Exact comparisons with other recent races and years are not possible because sufficient data is lacking, or is not comparable because expenditures are given in reported rather than real costs. However, some rough comparisons can be made. One of the most expensive primaries in recent years took place in 1954 when Goodwin Knight sought both the Republican and Democratic nominations for Governor under the then existing cross-filing system. Knight's strategy was to eliminate his Democratic opponent in the primary and he was prepared to spend sufficient money to achieve this objective. After a careful study of Knight's campaign, Leonard Rowe concluded that this race was "one of the costliest, if not the costliest campaign for elective office in the history of California."[6] According to Rowe, Knight spent in excess of $1 million for the primary and general election combined. This can be compared with Cranston's expenditures a decade later of $1 million in the primary alone.

Other recent examples of primary costs are summarized in Table 3, as reported to the Secretary of State by various candidates for statewide office. These figures show that no candidate has spent as much as $1 million in a primary contest, nor have the total reported costs ever amounted to more than $1.5 million. Even adjusting for indirect expenditures, it seems unlikely that any would match the costs of the 1964 Democratic primary. Another way of putting 1964 costs into

[4] For a discussion of tax benefits as a means of encouraging campaign contributions consult Herbert E. Alexander, *Tax Incentives for Political Contributions?* (Princeton: Citizens' Research Foundation, 1961).

[5] Alan Cranston, "A Million-Dollar Loser Looks at Campaigning," *Fortune*, November 1964, pp. 124, 278-280.

[6] Leonard Rowe, "Political Campaign Funds in California," (unpubl. diss., Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, 1957), p. 81.

TABLE 3
REPORTED EXPENDITURES FOR SELECTED STATEWIDE PRIMARY CONTESTS[a]
1958-1962

Contest and Year	*Reported Expenditures*
Governor 1958	
Brown (Dem.)	$402,400
Knowland (Rep.)	546,200
Senatorial 1958	
Engle (Dem.)	$299,200
Knight (Rep.)	116,900
Governor 1962	
Brown (Dem.)	$484,100
Nixon (Rep.)	453,000
Shell (Rep.)	532,000

[a] Data derived from reports filed with the California Secretary of State.

perspective is to compare expenditures on the basis of cost per vote obtained. This figure is calculated by dividing the total money reported spent by a candidate by the total votes he obtained, thereby getting a crude measure of the cost of each vote to a candidate. This calculation shows that each of Cranston's votes cost 79 cents, that Salinger's cost 55 cents and that Murphy's cost only 9 cents per vote. From earlier reported data, it appears that Joseph Shell set the record for the highest cost per vote in his race for the Republican gubernatorial nomination in 1962. However, he spent only 74 cents per vote; Cranston surpassed this amount so apparently he now holds the record.[7]

The conclusion from these comparisons is that the senatorial primary in 1964 was the most expensive in California's history, and Alan Cranston probably spent more in his losing battle to obtain his party's nomination than any previous winning or losing candidate.

Though our major concern has been with the senatorial race, we can compare the cost of this race with other primary contests in 1964. California provided the showdown battle between Nelson Rockefeller and Barry Goldwater for the Republican presidential nomination. The titanic struggle of these two men for the control of California's delegation to the Republican National Convention is reported to have cost $4 million, with this total divided, about evenly between the Goldwater and Rockefeller forces.[8]

[7] For other comparative costs see: Crouch, McHenry, Bollens and Scott, *California Government and Politics* 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 89. Our calculations of the cost of the Shell primary differ from that of these authors.

[8] Herbert E. Alexander, *Financing the 1964 Election, op. cit.*, p. 35.

TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED REAL COSTS
OF PRIMARY RACES 1964

Primary	*Expenditures*
U.S. Senator	$2,270,000
Rep. Presidential	4,000,000[a]
U.S. Congress	
California Legislature	750,000[b]
Total	$7,020,000

[a] Based on an estimate of expenditures made by Herbert E. Alexander in *Financing the 1964 Election, op. cit.*, p. 35.

[b] Based on the total reported expenditures of $486,436 plus our estimate of indirect assistance amounting to approximately $266,000. See Sacramento *Bee*, July 2, 1964.

Table 4 estimates the total costs of all primary races for elective office in California in 1964, revealing expenditures of over $7 million to nominate all candidates for elective office in California. In view of the Democratic senatorial and Republican presidential contests, one can assume that 1964 races set an all time record for primary campaigns in California. The coincidence of a highly competitive senatorial and presidential primary race in 1964 raised costs more than one might expect in more typical times. Both demonstrate, however, how expensive primaries can become in large states where the stakes of political power are high.

V. EXPENDITURES IN THE PRIMARY

Further insight into the costs of the campaign can be gained by an understanding of how the candidates spent their money. Fortunately, the finance reports required by California law provide fairly comprehensive information on campaign expenditures, thus permitting an analysis of where the money went. Table 5 presents the expenditure of funds by major category as reported by the four major candidates seeking nomination in the senatorial primary. The figures are those reported to the Secretary of State and do not include estimates of indirect expenditures.

Table 5 separates the expenditures into eight categories (salaries, travel, headquarters, supplies, billboards, mailers, television and radio and newspapers) representing the major items for which the money was spent. It includes amounts spent by each candidate for each item and the percentage of the total expenditures this represents. Expendi-

TABLE 5

CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES BY PURPOSE
SENATORIAL PRIMARY 1964

	Cranston	%	*Salinger*	%	*Murphy*	%	*Kaiser*	%
Salaries	$ 99,602	12.1	$ 40,854	8.6	$ 27,820	27.4	$ 45,747	10.1
Travel	31,362	3.8	14,468	3.0	7,669	7.5	16,717	3.7
Personnel	$130,964	15.9	$ 55,322	11.6	$ 35,489	34.9	$ 62,464	13.8
Headquarters	$ 56,160	6.8	$ 25,151	5.3	$ 6,425	6.3	$ 33,900	7.4
Supplies	27,011	3.3	12,040	2.5	5,657	5.6	4,656	1.0
Provisions	$ 83,171	10.1	$ 37,191	7.8	$ 12,082	11.9	$ 38,556	8.4
Billboards	$ 95,958	11.7	$ 87,276	18.3	$ 11,948	11.8	$116,581	25.7
Mailers	204,629	24.9	54,117	11.3	10,714	10.6	169,646	37.3
T.V. and Radio	250,268	30.4	226,919	47.6	28,702	28.2	22,096	4.9
Newspapers	46,340	5.6	14,481	3.0	1,856	1.9	32,086	7.0
Publicity	$597,195	72.6	$382,793	80.2	$ 53,220	52.5	$340,409	74.9
Miscellaneous	$ 11,976	1.4	$ 1,780	0.4	$ 721	.7	$ 13,151	2.9
Total	$823,306	100.0	$477,086	100.0	$101,512	100.0	$455,580	100.0

tures are then summarized into three general purposes for which the money was used: personnel, provisions, and publicity.

There was broad similarity in the expenditure patterns for Cranston, Salinger and Kaiser. All three candidates spent approximately 75 percent of their funds on publicity, about 15 percent on personnel and 10 percent on provisions. Murphy differed in that he spent only 52 percent of his total funds on publicity and about 35 percent on personnel. Murphy's tactics differed from the others in that he did not run a large media campaign, but depended more on direct contact with voters at meetings. He probably reasoned that his name was well known because of his movie career. Then too, he was thought to be the leading Republican candidate and he did not take Kaiser's challenge too seriously.

Although there was some similarity in the patterns of expenditures, there also was variation in the allocations of funds to specific expenditure items. Cranston, Salinger and Murphy spent the most money for television and radio, with Cranston topping them all with expenditures of $250,000. Salinger nearly matched this in dollars ($226,000) and proportionally he exceeded Cranston by spending 48 percent of his funds for television.[1] Little use was made of television programs, and the emphasis was on spot announcements. Salinger spent $40,000 for television spots on three of the largest Los Angeles stations and Cranston estimated that practically all of his TV budget went for them. It wasn't difficult to spend money in this way since it cost $1,200 for 20 second spots at certain times on N.B.C.'s Los Angeles station. Candidates pay a high price for their belief that TV is the most effective way to reach the largest number of voters.

Mailers and billboards were the other major means of communicating with the voters. Cranston led again with expenditures of $204,000 for mailers, followed by Kaiser's expenditures of $170,000. Kaiser spent little on television, preferring to put his money in mailers and billboards. With the exception of Murphy, each major candidate sent out at least one statewide mailer to all registered voters, and there were other smaller mailings to special groups. Cranston's statewide mailer consisted of a letter of endorsement written by Governor Brown or where possible by the local Congressman on official stationery (not printed at government expense). Two other mailers were sent out for

[1] The total of Cranston and Salinger reported spending on radio and television is about $6,000 more than broadcast station charges to Democrats for all offices in the primary period in California, as shown in *Survey of Political Broadcasting, Primary and General Election Campaigns of 1964* (Federal Communications Commission, July 1965) Tables 11 and 24, pp. unnumbered. Cranston and Salinger reports may have included some production costs or agency fees not charged by broadcast stations and therefore not included in the FCC survey.

Cranston whose cost does not appear in Table 5. These were prepared and circulated by the CDC and the AFL-CIO COPE. Both prominently featured Cranston as the endorsed candidate. The CDC mailer went out to every registered Democrat and was estimated to cost approximately $100,000, while the COPE mailer went to about 300,000 union members.[2]

A mailer endorsing Salinger for Senator went to voters in Los Angeles; it was sent first class and timed to arrive on the day before election. It noted the location of the polling place for each voter and contained a picture of John F. Kennedy surrounded by a black border with a message to "vote for these candidates who are in the tradition of our martyred President." This was considered very effective. Reportedly, Speaker Unruh helped pay for part of the cost.

Certainly mailings are a less expensive means of getting a message into a voter's home than is television. But the price of producing an effective mailer can be quite high, particularly if artwork or color photography is used. Most politicians feel that if a mailer is to escape the wastebasket, it must go first class; five cent stamps add up quickly.

Table 5 indicates that none of the candidates made extensive use of newspaper advertising. Cranston spent $46,000 on this item, the largest amount, although Kaiser in proportional terms outspent him with 7 percent of his funds going to newspapers as compared with 6 percent of Cranston's. While newspapers may be of declining importance in campaigns, Table 5 may under-report newspaper costs. Local committees tend to assume the costs of newspaper ads and frequently the only purpose of a local committee is to collect money for an ad endorsing a candidate and listing area supporters.

Table 5 shows no separate category of expenditures for election day activities. With the exception of Cranston, no candidate reported spending money for conveying voters to and from the polls or for hiring election day help. Cranston did list under personnel a nominal expenditure of $21,000 for precinct workers. It appears to be against the political mores in California to use paid political workers. In the 1962 campaign Speaker Unruh spent about $30,000 for paid precinct workers in Los Angeles and he was roundly criticized by the newspapers, CDC leaders and others. A paid worker, they intimated, was somehow a corrupt machine worker and to use them would lead to a revival of the evil political parties of the early years of this century. These sentiments, though not shared by all, are fairly widespread in

[2] Cranston, *op. cit.*, p. 124. The statewide CDC organization paid $25,000 for the preparation of the mailer and the local clubs assumed the mailing costs. The mailer did not go out first class as most clubs used a mailing permit, and the President of CDC estimated that the local clubs spent $75,000 on these charges.

California and politicians are restrained in spending money for election day workers.

In most campaigns, the largest percentage of funds is spent in Los Angeles County, which has more than 40 percent of the voters. Most statewide elections are won or lost in this area. It is said that a program on a major Los Angeles television station can be viewed by 74 percent of California's voters. Some indication of the division of funds between the North and South can be gained from Salinger's report. He divided his campaign organization between these two areas and 85 percent of the total funds were spent in the South and the remaining 15 percent by the northern committee. This exaggerates the difference somewhat since most of the media costs were borne by the southern groups, but it is probably safe to estimate at least a three to one division of funds with the larger amount being spent in the South.

Media Expenditures

Table 5 demonstrates the extent to which the candidates channeled their money into campaign publicity. Disregarding the varying media usage, each of the three leading spenders (Cranston, Salinger and Kaiser) put 75 percent or more of his funds on publicity. The emphasis on publicity is understandable since to the candidate the essential need is to communicate with the voters in such a way as to gain their support. Since it is impossible to meet each voter individually, the candidate must get his message across through the media.

From the point of view of the voter questions might be raised about the value of publicity, how the media are used, and the kind of messages relayed to the voter. The media are mostly used to create a public image, to get name recognition, to project a friendly personality. Little effort may be made to inform the voter on views of the candidates or to provide him with the means of making a reasonable choice among alternatives. The spot announcement does not permit a candidate much of an opportunity to say anything meaningful, but it does give him a chance to be seen, to project, and to reiterate his name to the voter. An advertising executive who handled television booking for the Salinger campaign said, "as far as I am concerned, Pierre Salinger is a bar of soap and we're going to sell him as effectively as we can."[3] The plan was to saturate the airways with spot announcements and to exploit as much as possible Salinger's close association with John F. Kennedy. Cranston's campaign was no different. He realized this when he pointed out after his defeat: "I have been distressed by the fact that a great part of the money spent in my own and most other campaigns is spent not to communicate the candidate's ideas and

[3] New York *Times*, May 21, 1964.

convictions, not to create an impression of what the candidate really is, but to create an image of what his managers think the voters would like him to be."[4]

One consequence of the emphasis on publicity is the increased importance of public relations firms in campaigns. As larger portions of the campaign budget go into publicity, it is understandable that the candidate and his manager turn to those who are expert in handling the media.[5] But in California, public relations firms specializing in campaign management usually do more than purchase media time and space. They are involved in planning overall campaign strategy, in designing many of the materials used, in doing research and writing speeches, in raising campaign funds, in arranging meetings and scheduling appearances, in checking voter opinion and its changes, and in managing the overall barrage of publicity.

All the candidates in the senatorial primary used public relations firms in their campaigns. Keene and Associates, a firm active in earlier Democratic campaigns, was employed by Alan Cranston, and played a most prominent role. Cranston's committee reported expenditures of $550,000, or about 70 percent, of its funds to the Keene agency. The fact that so much money was channeled through one agency suggests what an extensive role the firm played in the campaign.

Campaigns in California are expensive because logic demands use of expensive media, especially television. Some political experts believe there will be an even greater use of television in the future, for two reasons: (1) The weak and poorly organized political parties in California do not play a particularly important role in campaigns and therefore cannot be depended upon to deliver the vote as in other states. The only effective grass roots organizations are the volunteer groups, such as CDC, who charge bossism when an effort is made to put together a more professional political organization. (2) Population growth and mobility make it doubtful whether even more effective grass roots political units could organize voters so constantly on the move. It is estimated that 1,500 people a day move into California and that within Los Angeles, at least one-third of all families move each year. Such mobility hinders the development of neighborhood or ward organization as they exist in some areas.

For the Democrats this was a closely contested primary, with Salinger and Cranston running evenly throughout the campaign. The polls gave neither candidate a decisive lead and there were a large number of undecided voters until the end. The closeness of the race

[4] Cranston, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

[5] For a discussion of the role of public relations in contemporary American politics consult: Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Professional Public Relations and Political* Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956).

led the candidates to increase their spending in the last days of the campaign. Both candidates felt that victory might depend upon an extra, last minute effort and neither would chance losing for failure to make this last effort. So both spent and spent to match each other's expenditures.

Also at stake was a contest between factional elements within the Democratic party. This primary involved a test of strength of Governor Brown and his leadership of the Democratic party, of CDC and the role of volunteers within the party, and of Speaker Unruh and his ambitions. The Cranston and Salinger candidacies got mixed up in the struggle among these various forces. Some Cranston supporters felt that Brown's political fortunes were tied directly to Cranston's victory in the primary and that it was essential for Cranston to win, not only for himself, but the Governor. This pressure tended to raise costs. In the Salinger campaign there were similar pressures from Unruh's associates and from those who broke with the Governor. Hence the cost of the primary was high because of the wide use of media, the closeness of the race, and because of the significant political stakes resulting from factional divisions within the party.

The Debt

The escalating costs in the latter days of the campaign left Cranston and Salinger with sizeable deficits. In late March, Cranston and his major advisors met in Los Angeles with representatives of the Keene agency to plan the campaign and to lay out a budget. They estimated a primary campaign against Engle would cost approximately $500,000, and Cranston later reported they knew at that time that they could raise $400,000.[6] Salinger's estimate of the cost was arrived at more informally; shortly after he arrived in the state he announced his campaign would cost about $250,000. As events developed, both Cranston and Salinger underestimated their needs. Perhaps the best estimate of the actual cost of a senatorial campaign was Stanley Mosk's—$600,000.

In the last days of the campaign, both sides began to worry about mounting debts. This mutual concern led to an agreement for sharing the campaign deficit. A share-the-deficit agreement between Cranston and Salinger committed the winner of the primary to help raise up to $150,000 of the loser's debt. The plan, though negotiated in secret, became public when it was leaked to the press.

The idea for the share-the-deficit plan originated with Don Bradley, Salinger's campaign manager. Bradley's motives were rather uncomplicated. He realized that the election was going to be very close, that neither side was absolutely confident of winning and that both camps

[6] Washington *Evening Star,* Sept. 9, 1964.

were spending wildly with the hope of turning the tide to their favor. As the debts mounted, Bradley began to wonder how they would be paid off, particularly if his candidate lost. Bradley knew the winner would have no problem in collecting money to pay his debts, because of the widespread belief that the Democratic nominee would easily win in the general election. But he also knew that the loser would find it difficult to liquidate his debts. Bradley's concern led him to suggest to Eugene Wyman, the Chairman of the State Democratic Central Committee, the plan by which the winner would share the loser's debt. Wyman informed Governor Brown of Bradley's suggestion and the Governor immediately expressed interest. The Cranston forces were brought into the discussion and a plan was agreed upon two days before the election. Brown, of course, was interested in working out some means of handling the debt because of possible consequences to the Democrats in the election campaign. Brown knew the Cranston campaign had borrowed heavily from important Democratic contributors who would have to be paid off if they were going to help in the general election. The credit of the Democratic party would be at stake, he felt, if there were large outstanding debts from the primary. He believed also that a co-operative effort to pay off the campaign debt would bring the warring factions together. Looking forward to the election it seemed wise to work out an agreement whereby the deficit of the loser would be handled by the winner and the party.

The exact amount of the deficit is not known. Alan Cranston accumulated debts of $332,000, of which $219,000 were loans from large contributors. Most of this money, according to Cranston, was borrowed in the last weeks of the campaign. He reported that "in the last two weeks of the campaign we borrowed $150,000" and in "the last three days we borrowed $50,000 to meet television obligations."[7] This is probably a correct statement of his debt since as the loser Cranston had much to gain by revealing his exact financial condition. Less is known about Salinger's debt. He reported to the Secretary of State a $50,000 deficit but it appears that he owed more than this. Some expenditures were unreported because at the time of filing the bills were still outstanding. A reliable source close to Salinger estimated that unpaid bills due after the primary totaled $140,000. Thus, the two candidates reported debts of $380,000, but it would appear that the actual figure was close to $500,000.

Salinger's defeat in the general election complicated the agreement to share the debt. Those who negotiated the agreement assumed that the Democratic nominee would win, thereby facilitating the collection of money to pay the debt. The loss of the Senate seat put the burden

[7] Washington *Evening Star,* September 9, 1964.

of the debt on the Democratic party. This development displeased some Democrats, especially the followers of Speaker Unruh, who were already at odds with Governor Brown and Alan Cranston.

A fight about the agreement broke out in February, 1965, when Mrs. Carmen Warschaw, Southern Chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee, refused to allow funds raised at a party dinner to be used for the deficit.[8] Mrs. Warschaw's action raised some interesting questions about the debt agreement: Should the party be obligated to pay a primary debt when the law prohibits it from taking an official role in the primary? If the party committed itself to pay off the Salinger-Cranston debt, would this establish a precedent that could be extended to other candidates? Who had power to commit the party to such an obligation? Governor Brown insisted that the Democratic party had an obligation to pay off this particular deficit. He agreed, however, that "primary debts should not be a party obligation" and noted that "if we had elected a United States senator there would be no problem. . . . Our efforts to clear up this unfortunate situation," he went on to say, "should be coupled with the understanding that the party will not assume primary debts in the future."[9]

Whether the primary was worth all this money is a matter of judgment. To Pierre Salinger the price of victory was expensive but probably worth it. On the other hand, Alan Cranston may very well feel that the money was not wisely spent. Certainly the debt, even with the sharing plan, is a great burden on his political future. Some indication of his feelings is revealed in the following: "All in all most of what we spent in my primary was spent in ways that allowed me a minimum of opportunity to grapple with vital issues. To me, this makes the high cost of campaigning doubly disturbing."[10] California is, of course, a populous and wealthy state and one can argue that its citizens can easily afford $3.6 million to nominate and elect a senator. A large majority of the population, however, does not contribute to political campaigns, and candidates raise most of their funds from a small number of givers.

VI. RAISING THE FUNDS

Some of the more intriguing questions concerning campaign finance relate to sources of funds. Who gives to political campaigns? Why do they contribute? How do candidates organize to raise money? What

[8] San Francisco *Chronicle*, February 23, 1965.
[9] Los Angeles *Times*, February 15, 1965.
[10] Cranston, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

techniques are used to obtain funds? Knowledge of these matters is scattered and frequently tinged with sensationalism. It is easy to draw simplified or false conclusions. People contribute for complicated reasons involving human motivations which are difficult to explain. These motivations often involve more than self interest and no simple classification explains most behavior.

Information about who contributed to the senatorial campaigns is available in official reports, but the law does not require candidates to reveal how much was contributed by each individual. The law as interpreted requires merely that the names of all contributors be reported, and the reports contain a listing of them, the thousand dollar contributor mixed with the individual who gave only a dollar.[1] Despite these limitations, we can examine in general terms Cranston's and Salinger's sources of campaign finance.

Finance Organization

A non-party spirit has dominated California politics since the days of the Progressive movement. The Progressives distrusted parties and their reforms helped to weaken the parties and make them ineffective. As a result candidates could not depend upon the parties for political services, so they had to rely on their own resources to organize and finance their campaigns, even in general election campaigns.[2] In a primary, by law the party must remain neutral.

The Republicans have moved more rapidly to change the general election financing than have the Democrats. In 1949, the Republicans pioneered a centralized system of fund raising, establishing permanent finance units in the North and South to raise money through a united appeal patterned after Community Chest drives. The operation of the United Republican Finance Committee drive has not been uniformly successful nor effective, as similar Republican finance units have been in states such as Ohio. Yet it has geared the Republican party to fund raising and helped reduce to some extent the pressures on Republican candidates to raise their own funds.

The Democrats might be moving in this direction too. A group called the Golden Bear Club was formed in January 1965 with the objectives of raising money to finance statewide campaigns in 1966 and to help wipe out the deficits incurred by Cranston and Salinger in the 1964

[1] In recent years efforts have been made to change the campaign finance law, but each time the legislature has failed to act. The most recent attempt made in 1964 by Assemblyman Gordon Winton suffered the same fate of earlier measures His bill to require the specifications of the amount of money given by each contributor was pigeonholed in committee.

[2] Dean R. Cresap, *Party Politics in the Golden State,* (Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation, 1954), pp. 1-18, 94-100.

contest. The Club appears to be patterned on the President's Club, with memberships open to anyone willing to contribute a thousand dollars.[3] Pierre Salinger has assumed the chairmanship, and at its first organizational meeting at the Bel Air home of Democratic State Chairman Eugene Wyman, $100,000 was reportedly pledged by the 110 persons attending.[4] Should this kind of fund raising for the slate of statewide officers mature into a more formally organized finance arrangement, then the party may come to finance part of the cost of a campaign. Until it develops, the Democratic candidate will still assume the burden of money raising, even in a general election campaign.

In the primary, the finance organizations of Salinger and Cranston were fairly informal since only a handful of men raised most of the money. Both candidates were heavily involved in fund raising and it took a significant portion of their time. Cranston's finance chairman in the South was Joseph Wyatt, a lawyer, member of the State Personnel Board and formerly President of the CDC. However, the de facto chairman was Prentiss Moore, a Los Angeles lawyer, who also served as an inheritance tax appraiser. Apparently Moore had contacts with big givers and raised most of the money. He was experienced in fund raising, having worked for Governor Brown and Adlai Stevenson in earlier years. Irwin Nebron, formerly Cranston's Chief Deputy, and now a Los Angeles Municipal Court judge, apparently raised funds in the North and had some responsibility for gifts of inheritance tax appraisers. Two other persons were less directly involved in raising funds but nevertheless played a significant role: Governor Brown and Cranston's campaign chairman, Dan Kimball. The Governor is an effective fund raiser personally but money can also be raised in his name. He appeared at a number of fund raising events, lending his prestige to Cranston. He sent about 500 letters to persons he had appointed to political positions recommending Cranston's candidacy and encouraging their financial help.[5] And his signature was on a mass mailer. Kimball, an official of one of the nation's largest aerospace firms, was in a strategic position in Democratic politics to obtain money. But, as in the

[3] For further information on the President's Club see: Herbert E. Alexander and Harold B. Meyers, "The Switch in Campaign Giving" *Fortune*, November 1965. Also see Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-81.

[4] New York *Times*, February 4, 1965.

[5] In October 1965, the Los Angeles *Times* reported that a campaign committee to re-elect Governor Brown was soliciting contributions from gubernatorial appointees to state boards, commissions and departmental posts. Donations were based on a sliding scale ranging from $100 for those earning less than $12,000 to $1,500 for those earning in excess of $25,000. The Governor said that all such contributions were voluntary and that no one who refused to give would lose his job. Los Angeles *Times*, October 22, 1965.

case of the Governor, Kimball was a busy executive who played a secondary role in fund raising.

The finance chairman of Salinger's campaign was Lewis Wasserman, who as President of the Music Corporation of America had access to Hollywood money. Raymond Lapin, President of the Banker's Mortgage Company of San Francisco, served as a chairman in the North. But probably of greater significance than Lapin was Joseph Eichler, a land developer and home builder in the San Francisco Bay area. In the South, Eugene Klein, President of the National General Corporation, a holding company controlling some 200 movie theaters across the country,[6] also was active. Both Wasserman and Klein were active in fund raising for the national Democratic party in the state. Klein was Finance Chairman in California for the Democratic National Commitee and Wasserman raised money for the President's Club. Don Bradley, Salinger's campaign manager, probably raised a good share of money himself. As Governor Brown's chief political lieutenant, Bradley knew many of the important Democratic contributors and was able to seek their assistance. Though he professed neutrality during most of the campaign, Stanley Mosk also helped Salinger raise funds. There were persistent reports that Speaker Unruh assisted Salinger in raising funds, and though he might have helped by encouraging some of his financial backers to contribute to Salinger, he did not publicly associate himself with the campaign or assume a formal role in fund raising.

Techiques Used to Raise Money

"Pierre was looking for votes, for famous supporters and for contributors . . . at the dinner [Academy Award Dinner], for example, he picked up pledges of support from Natalie Wood and Sidney Poitier. . . . comedian Joey Bishop sent word to call on us for help. And at fund raising parties, Bill Dana does his Jose Jimenez bit, winding up with the exhortation: Now go out and vote for my friend Pierre Schlesinger."[7] The methods of raising funds for political campaigns are varied and are limited only by the shortcomings of the imagination. Political fund raisers have developed many stratagems to part people from their money, but the joining of Hollywood and Sacramento, of the politicians and the stars, is a productive means.

Methods of raising campaign funds vary from direct personal solicitation to indirect public appeals. The approach seems to be related

[6] It is interesting to note that Salinger after his defeat in the general election was hired as a Vice President of the National General Corporation at a salary of $35,000 a year. He has since become Vice President of Continental Air Lines.

[7] *Time* Magazine, April 27, 1964.

to the size of the contribution. The thousand dollar contributor is approached directly, but the $10 giver can be approached through a mailer or a television appeal.

Both Salinger and Cranston raised most of their money by direct personal solicitation, and both were financed by a fairly small number of individuals. Even though each candidate listed hundreds of contributors a large portion of the money came from only a few. This situation applies as well in many general campaigns, but more so in a primary because certain techniques that reach middle range contributors—e.g., subscription dinners—cannot be used as effectively.

The personal solicitation of funds started with the nucleus in the finance organization, who produced the original contacts with others, who in turn contacted more contributors. The key fund raisers, or "middle men in influence," performed the crucial service of providing the access to people of wealth.[8] Describing his activities, one Cranston fund raiser bluntly said "the man who can raise money is the one who is able to ask for it and who knows the people to ask." He continued, "you have to understand what interests contributors, what they want—power, position or prestige or some kind of service from government—and use this knowledge as a lever to raise funds."

The process may start with Dan Kimball or Eugene Klein, for example, inviting a small number of business associates and friends to a luncheon at which their candidate might appear. After extolling the virtues of either Cranston or Salinger, an appeal would be made for campaign funds. Someone who possibly had been prompted to do so would start the ball rolling with his pledge. Hopefully others would follow. These men would then seek out friends and associates from whom they would attempt to raise the funds to fulfill their pledges.

Other techniques were also used and there were differences in the ways each organization went about getting money. Cranston was supported by the Democratic establishment and could appeal to a wide range of contributors. Brown's endorsement of Cranston gave additional support not available to Salinger. The Governor's appeals by letter for financial help added money to Cranston's fund though most large contributors were approached directly. The Governor's backing of Cranston also provided the best access to the Democratic party's list of financial contributors.

In a negative way, too, the Governor was of great assistance to Cranston. He was able to block funds that might have gone to Salinger by indirectly putting "pressure" on contributors who were obligated to him in some way. The Governor was particularly effective

[8] Heard, *op. cit.*, pp. 259-268.

in cutting off funds to Salinger in an area of his strength where party regularity is strongest—in the North. It is impossible to know how much money Salinger lost in this fashion, but we know a few large givers—and certainly others—backed off from contributing to Salinger because they did not want to offend the Governor.

Both candidates held fund raising dinners and events. Cranston's commitee held a general subscription fund raising dinner at the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco in May 1964. The price was $100 a ticket and it was estimated that 400 people attended, which after expenses left about $30,000. A $100-a-couple dinner was held in Los Angeles for Salinger, with smaller attendance than Cranston's. The candidates also attended a number of cocktail parties and receptions at which funds were raised.

Even a public opinion poll can be used indirectly to raise funds. Cranston paid Oliver Quayle Co. $10,000 to measure voters' preferences. When the poll showed Cranston the probable winner, the information was used to convince potential contributors to get on the bandwagon and be on the winning side.[9]

Neither candidate made serious efforts to collect contributions from small givers. In the North the Salinger committee enclosed with a mailer a stamped envelope with which to send in contributions. Little money was raised by this appeal, however. Also, both candidates received some small unsolicited contributions. A number of these were sent to Salinger by people who still remembered and loved President Kennedy, but these did not add up to much money.

Analysis of Sources

Finance reports do not permit isolating the large givers or identifying them. It is possible, however, to speculate in general terms on the most important sources of funds, and to draw some tentative conclusions as to the financial base of each campaign.

Individuals contribute to campaigns for a variety of reasons.[10] Some give out of a sense of civic duty; they feel obligated to give financial support to our system of free elections. Others give because it somehow enhances their prestige or elevates their status; by giving they can mingle with the powerful, with a President, a Governor, or a Senator. Certainly one of the most important incentives for many large contributors and for most groups is access to government; giving usually opens doors, results in an official's willingness to listen, and provides a chance to plead a cause. Access does not mean that there is necessarily a consideration for every contribution. Every act

[9] Washington *Evening Star*, September 9, 1964.

[10] For a classification of contributor motives see: Heard, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-2.

of giving does not involve a *quid pro quo* between the candidate and a contributor. Access does not guarantee a favorable decision; it mainly provides the opportunity to be heard, something which in theory is available to any citizen. If the individuals and groups giving the most money to campaigns are those having large economic stakes in government, then the notion of access may imply special hearings and special considerations for special interests. Of course, everyone at one time or another has a stake in government's decisions, especially considering the widening scope of modern government. But if the bulk of money comes from interests that are regulated or assisted by government, then special dangers exist in the ways we finance our politics.

The fact that the Democrats are in office in California gives some advantage over its rival in raising money. Though there were important variations, both Cranston and Salinger drew on the interests traditionally allied with the Democratic party or on interests associated with the party because it is in power. These include, among others, individuals identified with savings and loan associations, insurance companies, retailers, labor unions, oil industry, liquor retailers and wholesalers, race track owners, building and highway contractors, aerospace and the entertainment industries.

Most informants answered candidly most questions but tended to shy away from specifics when asked the names of large givers and the amounts contributed. We know both candidates depended heavily on large contributors, though Salinger more so than Cranston. According to information available, between 70 and 80 percent of Salinger's money came from contributors of $500 or more as compared with about 50 percent of Cranston's. Salinger's greater dependence on large contributors resulted from his late entrance into the campaign and his restricted base of support within the Democratic party. Neither candidate depended very much on the small contributor giving $25 or less. It was reported the Cranston campaign received only 10 percent of total funds from this source.

Geographically, sources of funds as between North and South varied in both campaigns. Normally it is assumed that 35 percent of the funds raised come from northern California and the larger amount—65 percent—from the South. It has been estimated that Cranston approximated this, with 40 percent of his money coming from the North and 60 percent from the South. This greater dependence on northern money probably was due to the importance of Governor Brown in raising funds for Cranston. On the other hand, it has been estimated that Salinger raised 80 percent of his funds in the South and 20 percent in the North. Again this reflects the role of Governor

Brown in blocking funds in the North which might have gone to Salinger.

Cranston Funds

Cranston collected $490,000 in cash receipts, and obtained an additional $219,000 in loans, providing total receipts of approximately $700,000. For analytical purposes we can classify the cash receipts into broad categories and make some educated guesses as to the amount of money raised from each source. Cranston's sources of income and our estimates of the money collected from each source are summarized as follows:

Small contributors	$ 50,000
Governor Brown and Democratic party givers	$150,000
Labor	$ 50,000
Cranston, personal sources	$100,000
ITA	$150,000
Total	$500,000

Approximately $50,000 came from small contributors, including party rank and file, members of local Democratic organizations, and those committed enough to participate through giving. No special appeals were made for these funds and these contributors no doubt gave without expectation of any return. In addition small contributors provided most of the money for the $100,000 mailing sent out by CDC. It is notable, however, that Cranston, backed by the grass roots Democrats of CDC, raised only $50,000 directly from small givers. CDC has constantly attacked Democratic candidates' dependence on big givers, but even their candidate—Cranston—had to depend on these sources too.

The remaining $440,000 raised by Cranston came from four sources: 1) Governor Brown's supporters, 2) labor unions, 3) Cranston supporters, and 4) inheritance appraisers. As indicated, Governor Brown played a crucial role in Cranston's campaign by opening the doors to Democratic large givers. With notable exceptions, the financial establishment of the Democratic party backed Alan Cranston, as evidenced in comparing Cranston's contributors with a sample of the party's elite—consisting mostly of office holders, party officials, and large givers. A sample exists in the delegation to the 1964 Democratic National Convention, a broadly representative group of party influentials who for the most part were supporters of Governor Brown. An analysis reveals that of the 314 delegates and alternates to the 1964

convention 35 appeared as contributors to Cranston as compared with 13 who gave to Salinger.

One informant said that the "basic financing of the campaign" came from money raised in the name of Governor Brown. Another said that "at least one half of the total money raised" resulted from the Governor's help. A third source, however, indicated that Governor Brown's help was disappointing; he maintained that the economic interests behind the Governor are not the same as those who would wish to back a U.S. Senator. People seeking access to state government, he said, differ from those seeking access to the national government. Nevertheless, it can be estimated that about one-third of Cranston's funds—or between $100,000 and $150,000—came from sources available to Cranston because of Governor Brown's influence.

Organized labor was another of Cranston's major sources. Cranston was an ideal labor candidate, a liberal with an unblemished record of support for labor causes. Backed by labor in his two previous campaigns for controller, he easily obtained the endorsement of the state labor federation, COPE. While Salinger was liberal too, labor harbored suspicions about his association with the McClellan Committee and also because he seemed to equivocate on the need to terminate the bracero program.[11]

Cranston supporters anticipated receiving substantial labor assistance in the campaign. They expected to get money from the state COPE and from national unions as well. Yet, analysis of Cranston's financial report shows only two contributions from labor unions, the United Steel Workers of America and DRIVE, the political arm of the Teamsters' Union.[12] Some unions may have contributed but were able to avoid reporting. Perhaps some unions gave to local campaign committees not filing state reports. Possibly, some money was given in the name of a union official rather than the union itself. Some unions are reluctant to spend money in pre-nomination campaigns. In any case, Cranston's supporters were disappointed by labor and got about one-half of what they expected to receive. It was suggested by one person—though never confirmed—that Robert F. Kennedy was able to block some national labor funds intended for Cranston. In short, Cranston finance people may have been unrealistic about what they could expect from labor: labor funds are not as plentiful as many persons think.

Sources labeled as "Cranston, personal" are funds derived from con-

[11] The braceros were foreign contract laborers from Mexico entering the U.S. for temporary farm work. Organized labor opposed extension of this program because of competition between braceros and domestic farm workers.

[12] From reports filed in Washington under federal law DRIVE contributed $7,100 to Cranston's campaign.

tributors to earlier Cranston campaigns; they are sources that are peculiar to him, but exclusive of the inheritance tax appraisers. Considering that in each of his two earlier campaigns for controller Cranston raised about $300,000, it is obvious that he personally had sources to draw on. Including interest group money that Cranston may have been able to cultivate while being controller, wealthy friends who agreed with Cranston's outlook on public policy, and other friends and relatives, the candidate raised about $100,000 from this source.

The last source is the inheritance tax appraisers. The charges and counter-charges of the candidates, and the eventual judicial proceedings involving ITA contributions, made it most difficult to get reliable information on how much money actually came from these sources. On the other hand, an informant in the Salinger campaign maintained that the "going rate for a campaign assessment" for an ITA in Los Angeles was $3,000 and estimated that probably 50 percent of the Cranston funds came from these sources. On the other hand, a Cranston supporter took issue with this estimate and maintained that only between 15 and 20 percent of the total funds came from appraisers. Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing the real truth of the matter since the few persons who do have the facts refuse to divulge them.

Of the 148 inheritance tax appraisers, 117 appeared as contributors to Cranston's campaign. This is a high rate of contribution—about 80 percent—and would seem to indicate, at least, that there was little doubt in the minds of most appraisers that they were expected to give. Pressures may or may not have been applied to appraisers for contributions, but probably most gave readily; they would have been naive to have taken the job and not have expected to contribute. For in the past ITA's have contributed to controllers' campaigns and many other campaigns as well.[13]

Between $100,000 and $150,000 came to the Cranston campaign from the appraisers. Amounting to approximately one-third of the total funds, it would have been even higher if the issue of ITA contributions had not been made central to the campaign. The individual appraisers contributed varying sums depending upon the size of their appraiserships. There is no reason to assume that some kind of fixed assessment was set for each appraiser but very likely there was some self-imposed standard as to how much each appraiser felt he should give.[14]

[13] Alan Cranston announced that he would no longer accept any direct or indirect political contributions from inheritance tax appraisers. *Sacramento Bee*, November 11, 1965.

[14] A California Assembly committee recommended that the present system of inheritance appraising be abolished and replaced by a system of self assessment. Efforts to change the present system failed in the 1965 legislature. For the report of the Assembly Committee see: *State Inheritance Tax Appraising, op. cit.*

Salinger Funds

It is more difficult to generalize about Salinger's sources of campaign funds than about Cranston's. As an incumbent office holder, Cranston had developed a financial base that he could draw on to help pay for his senatorial campaign, and as the candidate backed by the party leadership, he had access to regular party financial sources. Salinger, on the other hand, had no such obvious sources. He was a last minute candidate with few connections in state politics. Yet surprisingly, Salinger did well in raising campaign funds and his reported receipts of $427,000 were not much less than the $490,000 in cash receipts raised by Cranston. It was quite an achievement for him to raise almost as much money as a well-established state office holder with organizational backing.

Salinger's reported receipts, however, include both cash receipts and money raised by loans. In contrast to Cranston, Salinger did not itemize separately on his report to the Secretary of State money received in the form of loans. In doing so, Cranston emphasized his indebtedness because as the loser he needed to pay off the loans. It is known that Salinger obtained a loan for the campaign that was co-signed by, perhaps among others, Lew Wasserman, Eugene Klein and Jule Styne, the composer. The major sources of Salinger's funds with estimates of money contributed by each source, follow:

Kennedy-oriented sources	$150,000
Mosk-oriented sources	$150,000
Dissident Democrats	$ 50,000
New givers	$ 50,000
Small contributors	$ 25,000
Total	$425,000

Just as Salinger expected to be helped to victory by his identification with John F. Kennedy, so did he expect that his connections with the Kennedys would provide funds for his campaign. This led to accusations during the primary that Salinger's campaign was being financed by out-of-state funds, and to more fanciful charges that Robert F. Kennedy masterminded the Salinger candidacy to advance his own political ends and was financing the Salinger campaign. Although Salinger did get money from Kennedy supporters, apparently few of them were from out of state. Although Robert Kennedy helped raise some funds, Salinger did not solicit nor did he receive any funds from the Kennedy family.[15] Little out-of-state money was put into

[15] Letter from Pierre Salinger to the author dated October 6, 1965.

the Salinger campaign, and indeed Salinger was disappointed when he realized how little money could be raised from such sources. He made several fund-raising trips to the East but it has been estimated that only 5 percent of his funds came from out-of-state sources.

The so-called Kennedy money that Salinger drew on came chiefly from Kennedy supporters within California, mostly from persons identified with the film industry in both its business and creative sides. Perhaps close to a third of Salinger's funds, or about $150,000, came from these sources. President Kennedy, though not the first politician to tap Hollywood for political funds, was probably more successful than most. He was able to enlist the financial support of creative artists along with the businessmen of the industry. If at one time a Hollywood star was not allowed to reveal his politics for fear that controversy would affect his box office appeal, times have changed. The big studios no longer control the personal lives of the performers and many stars today are deeply involved in politics.[16] President Kennedy was highly regarded in the movie capital and especially favored by some politically-oriented stars. It has been said that he gave prestige to movie actors by inviting them to the White House, and giving them a role in public functions, and that they in return gave Kennedy their loyalty and financial support. The list of those who contributed to the President's Club during Kennedy's tenure contains the names of many Hollywood entertainers. Salinger's access to the Hollywood community began while, as Kennedy's press secretary, he served as an intermediary between the President and the stars. He came to know many personally and when he decided to run for the Senate he knew he could turn to them for financial help. Of course, Wasserman and Klein were among President's Club fund raisers.

The second most important source of Salinger's funds was money derived from Stanley Mosk's friends. This category included contributors who normally would have financed Mosk's campaign but threw their support to Salinger after Mosk's withdrawal. Some of Mosk's important backers were liberals who might have helped Cranston but decided not to do so because they resented the treatment Mosk had reportedly received from Cranston's supporters. Believing that Mosk had been forced out of the Senate race by threats and intimidation, they refused to help the person they thought responsible. Mosk personally took an active role in persuading his financial backers to give to Salinger. And although unconfirmed, it was rumored that Mosk turned over to Salinger money that he had collected for his

[16] Lloyd Shearer, "Show Business Personalities Plunge into Politics", *Parade*, September 5, 1965.

abortive campaign. Clearly Mosk did raise some money before he withdrew and some of this money may have ended up in the Salinger campaign. Perhaps as much as $150,000 came from these sources.

Dissident Democrats include those who gave to Salinger because he opposed some part of the alliance supporting Cranston. These contributors could have been out of sympathy with Governor Brown, the CDC, with liberals, labor or Cranston personally. Jesse Unruh was the most prominent Democrat opposed to the Cranston alliance; Unruh had access to substantial money, much of it coming from lobbyists interested in state legislation.[17] Cranston's supporters accused Salinger of taking Unruh money for the campaign, and thereby becoming a pawn in the hands of the Speaker. As far as can be determined Salinger got very little money from Speaker Unruh. Admittedly some of Unruh's friends, who disliked Cranston, gave to Salinger, but they would have done so without any urging on the part of the Speaker. Speaker Unruh apparently made no concerted effort to channel funds into the Salinger campaign. From sources opposed to the leadership, we would estimate that Salinger raised about $50,000.

Perhaps another $50,000 came from large contributors who could not be categorized as Kennedy or Mosk people because they represented fresh converts to the ranks of political contributors. Salinger took pride in the fact that he attracted a number of large givers who had not taken an active role in politics prior to his campaign. Finally, smaller contributions, those contributing less than $500, gave a total of about $25,000.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

This study has dealt with the role of money in the 1964 Democratic senatorial primary in California—the costs, the ways the candidates spent their money and the sources of their funds. We have also dealt with the role of money in the pre-primary screening of candidates for the nomination. Certain conclusions can be drawn from this study, but the reader should be cautioned against over-generalizing from the findings. We have examined only one election for a single office in a state noted for its political variability.

The Democratic senatorial campaigns of 1964 were the most expen-

[17] In January 1966 at the Hollywood Paladium, a $100 ticket testimonial dinner was held honoring Speaker Unruh. It was estimated $250,000 was raised. Sacramento *Bee*, January 4, 1966.

sive in California's history of primaries. Almost twice as much money was spent in the primary as was reported spent in the general election. Factional divisions within the Democratic party contributed to these record costs. The Salinger-Cranston battle reflected the leadership struggle within the Democratic party between Governor Brown and his allies and the supporters of Speaker Unruh. In California there is almost as much competition within the major parties as between them, so a better understanding of money in politics demands more attention to primary campaigns.

This primary also demonstrated how mass media campaigning increases costs. The Salinger-Cranston contest was between the organization-backed candidate and an outsider with great personal appeal. Supported by the Governor and CDC, Cranston ran an organization-oriented campaign. Salinger used TV extensively to compensate for lack of such strength. TV provided an excellent means of emphasizing his close association with John F. Kennedy. Salinger spent about one-half of his funds on TV and his strategy forced the Cranston camp to spend more than it had originally planned. When the party organiaztion is as weak as in California, a candidate with personal appeal can easily challenge the party's man—but only if he has sufficient money for a massive media campaign.

The high cost of the primary must ultimately be evaluated in terms of its effect on the candidates and the party. Both candidates finished the campaign deeply in debt. In order to meet his obligations, Cranston had to borrow over $200,000 from a few wealthy contributors, and thereby placed a lien against his political future. Salinger, of course, entered the election campaign with the burden of his debt, and his loss compounded repayment difficulties. Normally, the party would not have been involved in the primary debt, but because of the unique agreement to share the deficit, it also became obligated. In 1965, the party devoted considerable effort to raising funds to meet an obligation it probably never should have assumed. This took place at a time when the party should have been laying a financial foundation for the 1966 elections.

Both candidates depended heavily on large contributors. As the organization candidate, Cranston got a good share of his money from regular party sources—the Governor's supporters and ITA appointees. Cranston's dependence on large givers raised questions about CDC's effectiveness; CDC has constantly attacked the Democratic party's dependence on large contributors, and has tried to lessen this dependence by providing its endorsed candidates with a free statewide mailer and volunteer workers. Its assistance is not sufficient, however, since Cranston had to turn to large contributors to wage his campaign.

It also appears that Cranston was more hurt than helped by his ITA supporters. The issue of appraiser contributions presented Salinger with an effective counter-attack to Cranston's charges that "boss" Unruh was behind Salinger. Cranston's decision to bar ITA contributions to his 1966 campaign for re-election as controller provides some support for this conclusion.

Salinger's success in raising money demonstrated the growing importance to the Democratic party of political contributions from the entertainment industry. Because of changes in the economics of the movie industry, entertainers do not feel barred from politics, and some have become big givers to Democratic candidates. Salinger's ability to raise funds, even though the established party opposed his nomination, points up the weakness of party control over fund raising. Since many large givers have traditionally identified with individual candidates rather than the party, Salinger easily cut into regular sources.

Though a great deal of money was spent, it is notable that money was not a decisive factor in either the pre-primary screening of candidates, the primary, or the general election. Money, though important, was not the significant factor that convinced any serious contender to withdraw from the race. This conclusion is particularly important with reference to Stanley Mosk's decision, since in his public statements he left the impression that the lack of funds forced him from the race. In addition, the candidate who spent the most money lost the primary, and the biggest spender in the general election lost also. There is no neat correlation between campaign spending and campaign results.

Finally, there was general agreement among those involved in the primary that serious problems of public policy are posed by the present system of financing political campaigns. All agreed that existing legal regulations of campaign finances are inadequate, and that far-reaching reforms are necessary.[1] The California law fails to provide for complete and accurate reporting by all groups engaged in raising funds, or for specification of amounts given by each contributor.[2] Many of the law's provisions, particularly those dealing with publicity, have not been adequately enforced.

It is possible to design a practical and workable law regulating campaign finances.[3] But more than better laws is needed to solve the problem of providing candidates with sufficient funds to meet campaign needs. The ultimate solution rests with the political parties and

[1] For some suggestions of needed reforms advanced by Alan Cranston see, Cranston, *op. cit.*, pp. 280.

[2] *Election Code*, Sections 11500-11631.

[3] Herbert E. Alexander, *Money, Politics and Public Reporting*, (Princeton: Citizens' Research Foundation, 1960); Heard, *op. cit.*, pp. 429-471.

the public. Ways must be found to change public attitudes toward contributing. And political parties and candidates must make more constructive and imaginative efforts to help themselves.

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